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TAXING EMPLOYERS FOR IMPOSING
MANDATORY ARBITRATION, CLASS




Employers impose coercive dispute resolution terms on their employees
more frequently, more broadly, and with greater legal success than ever
before. Recent survey data indicates that mandatory employment arbitra-
tion provisions bind more than 60 million American workers—over half of
the U.S. private-sector nonunion workforce. Employment class action
waivers bind nearly 25 million American workers.
In 2018, the Supreme Court held 5–4 that mandatory arbitration provi-
sions and class action waivers imposed by employers on their employees
do not violate the National Labor Relations Act. These terms prohibit em-
ployees from exposing employer wrongdoing in open court, bar employees
with valid wage and hour claims from collectively—and thus cost-effi-
ciently—asserting those claims, and prevent employees who have suffered
workplace harassment from establishing or even knowing that similar
claims have been made by other employees, thereby allowing patterns of
harassment to continue. Yet the Supreme Court’s recent ruling means that
millions more American workers are likely to become subject to these coer-
cive employment dispute resolution terms.
While harming more than 60 million American workers, coercive em-
ployment dispute resolution terms do something else—something that tax
law enforcers historically and currently ignore. They enrich the employers
who impose them. They give employers a new, valuable intangible asset
that the employers did not have before. For the employers who impose
them, coercive employment dispute resolution terms are an accession to
wealth, clearly realized, and in the employer’s control. They are income to
the employer, and they should be taxed as such.
* Professor of Law, Wake Forest University; LL.M.—Taxation, University of Wash-
ington; J.D., Yale Law School; B.S., Santa Clara University. Thank you to Brooke Church
and Brooke Foster for excellent research assistance. Thank you to Jessica Clarke, Hiba
Hafiz, Raj Nayak, Grace Meng, and Robert and Catherine Morrow for helpful comments
and encouragement.
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I. INTRODUCTION
“BEST Wishes Kevin” was piped in frosting below an Ameri-can flag.1 Navy Reserve Lieutenant Commander Kevin Zi-ober attached a picture of the cake that his employer bought
him to written testimony that he submitted to the House Subcommittee
on Antitrust, Commercial, and Administrative Law.2
In 2012, Ziober, then a manager at federal contractor BLB Resources,
“received official orders from the Navy to deploy to Afghanistan for 12
months.”3 Publicly, his employer hosted a surprise party with decorations,
gifts, and the cake4 to thank Ziober for his service.5 Privately, and on the
same day as the party, his employer—in violation of the Uniformed Ser-
vices Employment and Reemployment Rights Act—fired Ziober and told
him that his job would not wait for his return from active duty.6 As Zi-
ober describes,
Around 4:45 that same afternoon, I was summoned to a meet-
ing . . . . I was fired on the spot and told that my position would not
be waiting for me upon my return from active duty.
The shock of learning that I was being terminated from my job on
the eve of my deployment to a combat zone created an unimaginable
amount of concern and anxiety about how I would support myself
and my family when I returned home. In the course of a few hours, I
went from feeling supported, proud, and focused on serving my
country, to feeling embarrassed, confused, and concerned about the
well-being of my loved ones.7
1. Justice Denied: Forced Arbitration and the Erosion of our Legal System: Hearing
on H.R. 1423, H.R. 7109, and H.R. 2631 Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust, Commercial,
and Admin. Law of the H. Comm on the Judiciary, 116th Cong. 4 (2019) [hereinafter
Forced Arbitration Hearings], https://docs.house.gov/meetings/JU/JU05/20190516/109484/
HHRG-116-JU05-Wstate-ZioberK-20190516.pdf [https://perma.cc/D9H8-P3B6] (state-
ment of Kevin Ziober, Lieutenant Commander, U.S. Navy Reserves).
2. Id.
3. Id. at 3–4.
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It was a day that revealed the stark contrast between how some employ-
ers behave in open, public forums and how they treat their employees in
private.
When Ziober returned from Afghanistan, he filed suit in federal court
to enforce the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment
Rights Act.8 The first order entered in his case was an order of dismissal.9
Before even allowing discovery, the court closed its doors to Ziober. In
Ziober’s words, his former employer “immediately filed a motion to com-
pel arbitration, arguing that the paperwork that I was forced to sign . . .
took away my right to go to court. The judge granted the motion, dis-
missing my case and sending it to a private arbitration company for
resolution.”10
You see, BLB Resources had imposed on its workforce a mandatory
arbitration provision that shielded BLB from judicial enforcement of the
law.11 As Ziober testified before the House Subcommittee,
 Six months into my tenure at BLB, the company asked me and
other employees to sign several legal documents, including an arbi-
tration agreement as a condition of keeping our jobs. Like other em-
ployees who needed their jobs to make ends meet, I felt that I had no
choice but to sign the papers. I had no intention of losing my liveli-
hood. Plus, things were going well for me at the company, I didn’t
foresee any legal issues arising, and I didn’t want to cause any
problems, so I signed the paperwork and I moved [on to] doing my
job to the best of my ability.12
Ziober was not alone:
[I]ncreasingly employers are requiring reservists to enforce their
rights in secret arbitration proceedings that are often overseen by
arbitrators selected by employers with a limited opportunity for re-
servists to discover the key facts in their cases. These employers hope
that the secrecy of arbitration will prevent the public from learning
about how they have mistreated reservists or veterans, even if it
means taking away many of the key rights that Congress has be-
stowed upon reservists since the 1940s.13
Indeed, military service members are not alone. Employers often uni-
laterally impose their preferred form of dispute resolution on their collec-
tive workforces and bar employees from seeking open, public resolution
of workplace disputes in court. As Ziober testified, “arbitration does not
just impact servicemembers or veterans. The increasing and systemic use
of forced arbitration is impacting every American and taking away our
rights to enforce the federal and state laws that promote economic oppor-




12. Id. at 4.
13. Id. at 3.
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tunity and security, protect our health and safety, and stamp out fraud.”14
Mandatory employment arbitration provisions undermine the rule of law
and particularly harm victims of wage theft and sexual harassment, whose
best recourse against employer misconduct is an open court.
The law student-founded People’s Parity Project recognizes these
harms and advances its mission of “demystifying and dismantling the co-
ercive legal tools that allow the powerful to get away with violating work-
ers’ rights.”15 It exposes law firms that use mandatory employment
arbitration clauses, class action waivers, and nondisclosure provisions that
“prohibit employees from publicly discussing if they experience work-
place harassment or abuse” and uses collective action and public expo-
sure to stop them.16 For example, it maintains a spreadsheet tracking the
use of coercive employment dispute resolution terms by nearly four hun-
dred law firms.17 Unfortunately, despite the excellent work of the Peo-
ple’s Parity Project, “[s]ome firms have dropped coercive contracts in
response to student pressure, but others have not.”18 More broadly,
workers in most other industries do not have an organization like the
People’s Parity Project.
Employers require mandatory arbitration of workplace disputes for
half of the U.S. workforce19 and, in the process, shield themselves from
complaints by their employees, judicial enforcement of law, and publicly
accessible court orders.20 A dispute that would otherwise be public and
unflattering becomes private and contained.21 Further, employers pro-
hibit class action and other collective dispute resolution mechanisms and
require that 23.1% of private-sector nonunion U.S. workers “go it alone”
in individual arbitration proceedings of employment disputes.22 This Arti-
cle will collectively refer to employer-promulgated pre-dispute
14. Id. at 9.
15. PEOPLE’S PARITY PROJECT, https://www.peoplesparity.org/ [https://perma.cc/
6N3H-GJXZ].




19. See ALEXANDER J.S. COLVIN, ECON. POL’Y INST., THE GROWING USE OF
MANDATORY ARBITRATION 5 (2018), https://www.epi.org/files/pdf/144131.pdf [https://
perma.cc/9X3M-GNKX].
20. While arbitration filings and rulings are private, most court pleadings and orders
are unsealed, publicly accessible, and increasingly available through searchable online
sources.
21. KATHERINE V.W. STONE & ALEXANDER J.S. COLVIN, ECON. POL’Y INST., THE
ARBITRATION EPIDEMIC: MANDATORY ARBITRATION DEPRIVES WORKERS AND CONSUM-
ERS OF THEIR RIGHTS 17 (2015), https://www.epi.org/publication/the-arbitration-epidemic/
[https://perma.cc/W2H5-ETJZ] (“Arbitration processes in general involve some form of
private tribunal that adjudicates the issue in dispute. Arbitration procedures are typically a
simpler, more informal version of court procedures, for example relaxing the formal rules
of evidence. Underneath these generalizations, however, there is a great deal of variation
in arbitration procedures. Different arbitration procedures vary considerably in their de-
grees of formality, similarity to court procedures, and amount of due process provided to
the participants. The arbitration agreement itself is the primary source of the rules gov-
erning the arbitration process.”).
22. COLVIN, supra note 19, at 11.
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mandatory arbitration terms,23 class action waivers, and provisions
prohibiting disclosure of disputes in employment contracts as coercive
employment dispute resolution terms.
When coercive employment dispute resolution terms are the result of
full and fair bargaining between adversaries with equal bargaining
power—such as between an employer and an equally powerful union—it
might be reasonable to assume that the coercive employment terms were
exchanged for adequate consideration, likely in the form of higher com-
pensation.24 In such circumstances, the coercive employment terms are
bilaterally imposed. This Article will briefly describe how bilaterally im-
posed coercive employment dispute resolution terms are currently ig-
nored by the tax system, with the unfortunate result that they are
effectively tax-subsidized.25 However, bilaterally imposed coercive em-
ployment dispute resolution terms are neither the norm26 nor the focus of
this Article.
Employers impose the vast majority of coercive employment dispute
resolution terms unilaterally.27 Courts uphold and enforce these terms
even if they are imposed after an employment relationship has begun and
without any additional compensation or other consideration.28 Employers
can require employees to sign mandatory arbitration agreements
23. This Article will use the definition of mandatory arbitration provided by Cynthia
Estlund. Cynthia Estlund, The Black Hole of Mandatory Arbitration, 96 N.C. L. REV. 679,
683 (2018) (defining the term “mandatory arbitration” as “employer-promulgated pre-dis-
pute arbitration agreements in the non-union workplace”).
24. See STONE & COLVIN, supra note 21, at 14 (“In the unionized setting, labor arbitra-
tion provides a jointly established mechanism for enforcing the provisions of collective-
bargaining agreements and providing industrial justice in the workplace. Labor arbitration
has been one of the most enduring and successful features of the American industrial rela-
tions system because it has served the interests of both unions and management, and both
parties are equally involved in establishing and administering the system.”).
25. Bilaterally imposed coercive employment terms receive an unjustified and im-
proper tax subsidy. See infra notes 175–79 and accompanying text. However, this Article
focuses on unilaterally imposed coercive employment terms, which are more common, and
which receive a greater and even more problematic tax subsidy.
26. Just 10.3% of the workforce is unionized, and the power of a prospective employee
to do other than sign an employment contract with adhesive terms drafted by the employer
is low. See News Release, Bureau Lab. Stat., U.S. Dep’t Lab., Union Members—2019 1
(2020).
27. COLVIN, supra note 19, at 15 n.18 (“One of the most important differences is that
labor arbitration procedures are jointly established and administered by unions and man-
agement, in contrast to mandatory arbitration, which is unilaterally established by the em-
ployer. In addition, most labor arbitration procedures do not bar employees from bringing
statutory employment claims separately through the courts.”).
28. This distinguishes mandatory arbitration provisions and class action waivers from
noncompete agreements (where adequate consideration is often asserted by employers,
required by law, or both). Indeed, even when a mandatory arbitration provision is included
in an unconscionable contract, courts require that the claim of unconscionability be arbi-
trated. See, e.g., STONE & COLVIN, supra note 21, at 9 (“In 2010, in Rent-A-Center West v.
Jackson, 561 U.S. 63 [(2010)], the Court expanded the separability doctrine in a way that
eliminated many unconscionability challenges to arbitration clauses. In that case, the Court
held that a party who claimed that the arbitration clause in his employment contract was
unconscionable under his state law had to bring that claim to arbitration because the aspect
of the arbitration clause he alleged was unconscionable was not the same aspect to which
he objected.”).
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(MAAs) as a condition of employment, and they can refuse to hire pro-
spective employees who do not sign.29 These terms are enforced even if
they are first disclosed in “welcome” packets for new employees, emailed
to existing employees, or adopted through unilateral changes to company
policy.30 Coercive employment dispute resolution terms are upheld
against employees who did not even know that they existed.31
Unilaterally imposed coercive employment dispute resolution terms
enrich the employers who impose them. They prevent workers from
bringing claims, make it less likely that workers will win employment-
related disputes, and depress damages. They are stunningly effective at
shielding employers from liability for violating wage and hour laws, an-
tidiscrimination laws, sexual harassment laws, and more. By imposing a
coercive employment dispute resolution term, an employer obtains a new
and extremely valuable intangible asset that the employer did not have
before—a legally enforceable right that closes court doors to employees
claiming misconduct, makes meritorious claims less likely to be brought
and less costly to the employer when brought, and prevents the employer
from being publicly exposed for its unlawful conduct.
This Article exposes the previously ignored tax consequences that
should apply to an employer who imposes a coercive employment dispute
resolution term on an employee. It proposes a new check on mandatory
arbitration, class action waiver, and nondisclosure of dispute provisions
by arguing that when employers impose these terms on their workers,
proper tax treatment requires that the employers report the benefit re-
ceived as gross income and pay tax on it.32
Some experts have called coercive employment dispute resolution
terms free insurance policies that shield employers from the conse-
quences of their own misconduct;33 others have called them “get out of
29. See COLVIN, supra note 19, at 2.
30. See Jean R. Sternlight, Mandatory Arbitration Stymies Progress Towards Justice in
Employment Law: Where To, #MeToo?, 54 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 155, 171–72 (2019);
infra notes 31 and 301 and accompanying text.
31. Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Mandatory Arbitration of Individual Employment
Rights: The Yellow Dog Contract of the 1990s, 73 DENV. U. L. REV. 1017, 1018 (1996)
(explaining that courts will treat a mandatory arbitration provision in an “Employee Hand-
book as a waiver of your rights to sue in court under most federal and state employment
laws. Thus the employer, by giving you the booklet and unilaterally establishing an arbitra-
tion procedure, has relieved herself of numerous burdensome employment regulations”);
STONE & COLVIN, supra note 21, at 4–5 (“Arbitration clauses are also often included in the
company orientation and personnel materials a worker receives when beginning a new job.
Because these arbitration clauses are usually buried in a sea of boilerplate, many people
who are subject to them do not realize that they exist or understand their impact. These
terms are called mandatory or forced arbitration because if the employee . . . does not
agree to arbitration, he or she will be denied employment . . . . The employee . . . has no
real choice or ability to negotiate the terms of the arbitration clause. Mandatory arbitration
in the . . . employment setting is very different from arbitration clauses in contracts be-
tween two businesses or a company and a union; in those cases, the parties have voluntarily
negotiated as equals and knowingly agreed to arbitrate disputes between them.”).
32. See infra Part V.
33. See infra note 61 and accompanying text.
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jail free” cards for unscrupulous employers;34 others have called them
“wealth transfers” from workers to employers.35 Each analogy shows why
employers should be taxed for imposing coercive employment dispute
resolution terms. The imposition of these terms gives employers a new
and valuable intangible asset that they did not have before, occurs due to
the employers’ exercise of control, and enriches the employer at the ex-
pense of employees (rather than, for example, in exchange for payment
or other consideration). No one would doubt that a taxpayer who re-
ceives free insurance coverage (or who receives a get-out-of-jail-free card,
if such a card existed) realizes gross income upon the receipt. Nor should
we doubt that an employer who enriches itself by imposing coercive em-
ployment dispute resolution terms on its workforce realizes gross income
upon that imposition. Indeed, employers acknowledge the value of these
terms in other contexts.36 The matter, therefore, becomes how to approx-
imate the value of the gross income that an employer receives by impos-
ing such a term.
In addition to arguing that the imposition of a coercive employment
dispute resolution term results in gross income to the employer and
should, at long last, be taxed as such, this Article proposes a method to
approximate the value of that gross income based on the damages that
employers predictably save by imposing these terms.37
While taxing employer-imposed mandatory arbitration and other coer-
cive employment dispute resolution terms is an incomplete solution that
should be combined with public and legislative efforts to discourage em-
ployer-imposed mandatory arbitration, class action waiver, and nondis-
closure provisions, it is an incomplete solution with promise. Requiring
employers to pay tax on the benefit that they receive by imposing coer-
cive employment dispute resolution terms would discourage the increas-
ingly frequent and broad use of these terms. It would uphold
foundational principles of tax law and raise revenue to fund the enforce-
ment of labor laws, antidiscrimination laws, and workplace accommoda-
tion laws.
34. STONE & COLVIN, supra note 21, at 3.
35. Deepak Gupta & Lina Khan, Arbitration as Wealth Transfer, 35 YALE L. & POL’Y
REV. 499, 502 (2017).
36. Andrea Cann Chandrasekher & David Horton, Arbitration Nation: Data from
Four Providers, 107 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 16 (2019). Chandrasekher and Horton note that
some companies find mandatory arbitration so valuable that, even when they unilaterally
impose arbitration, they include in their mandatory arbitration provisions “rewards for
plaintiffs to arbitrate those claims on an individual basis.” Id. For example, “AT&T, Sallie
Mae, and Verizon promised to pay a bounty of between $5,000 and $10,000 and up to
double attorneys’ fees to any consumer who won an award that exceeded the company’s
settlement offer” in an effort to increase the chances that a court will uphold their
mandatory arbitration provision. Id.; see also Myriam Gilles, Killing Them with Kindness:
Examining “Consumer-Friendly” Arbitration Clauses After AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion,
88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 825, 857–58 (2012) (describing various “[b]ounties, [p]remium
[p]ayments, and ‘[b]ump-[u]ps’” that many companies, including Clearwire, T-Mobile,
Sally Mae, Netflix, Verizon, Microsoft, and Sovereign Bank, proffer to pay customers in
the forced arbitration provisions they impose on their customers).
37. See infra Section IV.C.
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II. PREVALENCE AND HARMS
Employer-imposed pre-dispute mandatory arbitration provisions bind
an increasing number of American workers. These provisions often in-
clude bars to collective or class action style dispute resolution and nondis-
closure provisions that silence employees who might otherwise honestly
report that their employers violate wage and hour laws, engage in unlaw-
ful discrimination, or perpetrate sexual harassment. Employers claim that
these provisions benefit workers as well as employers by keeping time
and cost spent on dispute resolution low. Claims of mutual benefit might
resonate if post-dispute, voluntary arbitration agreements were the norm.
Unfortunately, they are not. Instead, employers subject employees to ar-
bitration as a condition of employment in ways that give employees little
to no meaningful alternative and bind them despite their wishes.38 Unfor-
tunately, the consequences are severe. For a time, “there was no evidence
on how mandatory arbitration would actually work when designed by the
more powerful party in the highly asymmetric employment relationship
and imposed as a condition of initial or continued employment. The em-
pirical evidence . . . is now in.”39
Far from providing mutual benefit, employer-imposed mandatory arbi-
tration is extremely beneficial to employers and extremely harmful to
employees:
[B]y imposing mandatory arbitration on its employees, an employer
can ensure that it will face only a miniscule chance of ever having to
answer for future legal misconduct against employees. Such a provi-
sion amounts to a virtual ex ante waiver of substantive rights [of em-
ployees] that the law declares non-waivable.40
The extensive and increasing use of these terms and their favorable re-
ception at the Supreme Court is especially damaging in light of the sever-
ity of harm they cause.
A. OVER HALF THE WORKFORCE AND GROWING
A large and growing number of American workers are or have been
subject to MAAs with their employers that often prevent them from
bringing collective or class-action-like challenges to unlawful employment
practices and silence their efforts to warn fellow workers and the public
about illegal activity by their employers.
The trend began in 1991, when, in Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane
Corp., the U.S. Supreme Court held that mandatory arbitration provi-
sions in employment contracts were enforceable.41 “Gilmer gave the
38. Stone, supra note 31, at 1020 (“[I]n the nonunion setting . . . mandatory arbitration
is often imposed as a condition of employment, without any consent or bargaining.”).
39. Estlund, supra note 23, at 707.
40. Id.
41. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 35 (1991) (holding that
mandatory arbitration provision could be applied to former employee’s claim that em-
ployer violated the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) by firing him when
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green light to employers to require employees to sign arbitration agree-
ments as a mandatory term and condition of employment. The case and
its progeny allowed employers to unilaterally introduce arbitration proce-
dures to cover statutory employment rights” that would bar employees
from enforcing their statutory employment rights in open court, and, fur-
ther, allowed employers to “make these procedures mandatory in the
sense that the employer would refuse to hire a job applicant who would
not sign the arbitration agreement.”42
These employer-imposed mandatory arbitration provisions
bar access to the courts for all types of legal claims, including em-
ployment discrimination and sexual harassment claims based on Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act, protections for employees with disabili-
ties under the Americans with Disabilities Act, rights to maternity
and medical leaves based on the Family and Medical Leave Act, and
entitlements to minimum wages and overtime under the Fair Labor
Standards Act.43
In the early 1990s, mandatory arbitration employment terms were ex-
tremely rare. A 1992 study found that only about 3.7% of companies sur-
veyed included arbitration provisions in their employment terms.44 With
these provisions being held enforceable, however, employers quickly ex-
he was sixty-two years of age). The majority enforced the mandatory arbitration provision
despite a compelling dissent by Justice Stevens that highlighted many of the failings of
mandatory arbitration. See id. Justice Stevens wrote in dissent:
Not only would I find that the [Federal Arbitration Act (FAA)] does not
apply to employment-related disputes between employers and employees in
general, but also I would hold that compulsory arbitration conflicts with the
congressional purpose animating the ADEA, in particular. As this Court pre-
viously has noted, authorizing the courts to issue broad injunctive relief is the
cornerstone to eliminating discrimination in society. The ADEA, like Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, authorizes courts to award broad, class-
based injunctive relief to achieve the purposes of the Act. Because commer-
cial arbitration is typically limited to a specific dispute between the particular
parties and because the available remedies in arbitral forums generally do
not provide for class-wide injunctive relief, I would conclude that an essential
purpose of the ADEA is frustrated by compulsory arbitration of employ-
ment discrimination claims. Moreover, as Chief Justice Burger explained:
Plainly, it would not comport with the congressional objectives behind a
statute seeking to enforce civil rights protected by Title VII to allow the
very forces that had practiced discrimination to contract away the right to
enforce civil rights in the courts. For federal courts to defer to arbitral
decisions reached by the same combination of forces that had long perpet-
uated invidious discrimination would have made the foxes guardians of the
chickens.
Id. at 41–42 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citations omitted) (quoting Barrentine v. Ark.–Best
Freight Sys., Inc., 450 U.S. 728, 750 (1981) (Burger, C.J., dissenting)).
42. STONE & COLVIN, supra note 21, at 15.
43. COLVIN, supra note 19, at 3; see also id. (“If an employment right protected by a
federal or state statute has been violated and the affected worker has signed a mandatory
arbitration agreement, that worker does not have access to the courts and instead must
handle the claim through the arbitration procedure designated in the agreement.”).
44. Peter Feuille & Denise R. Chachere, Looking Fair or Being Fair: Remedial Voice
Procedures in Nonunion Workplaces, 21 J. MGMT. 27, 36 (1995) (survey of grievance proce-
dures found that only 4 of 107 responding firms provided for a decision by an outside
arbitrator).
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panded them. A Government Accountability Office survey estimated
that by 1995, 6.7% of employers with no union workers had adopted
mandatory arbitration.45 A 2003 survey of the telecommunications indus-
try found that 22.7% of that industry’s nonunion workforce was subject
to mandatory arbitration of employment-related disputes.46
In 2018, Professor and now-Dean of Cornell University’s School of In-
dustrial and Labor Relations, Alexander Colvin, conducted a “national
survey of private-sector American business establishments” and found
that 50.4% of responding employers reported that their employees were
required to sign—usually at the time of hire—a “mandatory ‘agreement
or provision for arbitration of legal disputes with the company.’”47 An
additional 3.5% of responding employers reported that they adopted
mandatory arbitration provisions “simply by announcing” to their ex-
isting workforce that these terms had been “incorporated into the organi-
zation’s employment policies.”48 Thus, a total of 53.9% of responding
employers indicated that they impose mandatory arbitration of employ-
ment-related disputes.49
Because employers imposing mandatory arbitration provisions tend to
employ larger workforces,50 the survey adjusted for workforce size to
conclude that “overall 56.2 percent of employees in the establishments
surveyed were subject to mandatory arbitration procedures.”51 Strikingly,
the survey concluded that “[e]xtrapolating to the overall private-sector
nonunion workforce, this corresponds to 60.1 million American workers
who are now subject to mandatory employment arbitration procedures
and no longer have the right to go to court to challenge violations of their
employment rights.”52 Researchers expect the percentage of workers sub-
ject to mandatory employment arbitration provisions to grow signifi-
cantly in response to recent Supreme Court rulings.53
45. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO/HEHS-95-150, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMI-
NATION: MOST PRIVATE-SECTOR EMPLOYERS USE ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION
12 (1995); see also id. at 28 (reporting that 9.9% of businesses used arbitration, and of
those, 47.1% had policies that made arbitration voluntary for all workers, 13.9% made it
voluntary for some workers, and 39.0% made it mandatory for all workers).
46. Alexander J.S. Colvin, Empirical Research on Employment Arbitration: Clarity
Amidst the Sound and Fury?, 11 EMP. RIGHTS & EMP. POL’Y J. 405, 410 (2007).
47. COLVIN, supra note 19, at 5. Professor Colvin’s “survey was conducted from March
2017 to July 2017 and had a sample size of 627, yielding a margin of error at 95 percent
confidence of plus or minus 3.9 percentage points.” Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. See id. at 6 (“Whereas 53.9 percent of all establishments had mandatory arbitra-
tion, among establishments that were part of companies with 1,000 or more employees,
65.1 percent had mandatory arbitration, which is a statistically significant difference (at the
p < 0.05 level) from the 50.5 percent of establishments with fewer than 1,000 workers that
had mandatory arbitration. Breaking down employer size further . . . we see that it is the
very largest employers who have the highest rates of adopting mandatory arbitration.”).
51. Id. at 5.
52. Id.
53. See, e.g., id. at 5 (finding “substantial growth in the adoption of mandatory em-
ployment arbitration agreements” during the five-year period following Supreme Court’s
pro-employer ruling in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 (2011)).
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Requiring mandatory arbitration of employment-related legal disputes
is not the only tool that employers use to reduce their legal and public-
relations exposure. Increasingly, employers require their employees to
waive class action rights as a condition of employment.54 By virtue of
signing a provision requiring that mandatory arbitration consist of indi-
vidual suits, workers are prevented from engaging in collective action to
challenge wage and hour violations, hostile workplaces, or other unlawful
employment practices that harm multiple workers. Professor Colvin’s sur-
vey found that
overall 41.1 percent of employees covered by mandatory arbitration
procedures were also subject to class action waivers. Relative to the
overall workforce, including both those covered and those not cov-
ered by mandatory arbitration, these estimates indicate that 23.1 per-
cent of all private-sector nonunion employees are subject to class
action waivers in mandatory arbitration procedures, corresponding
to 24.7 million American workers.55
Again, researchers expect the percentage of workers subject to class ac-
tion waivers to grow significantly in response to recent Supreme Court
rulings.56
B. HARMS
Mandatory arbitration provisions, class action waivers, and provisions
prohibiting the disclosure of workplace disputes subject workers to wage
and hour violations without remedy, perpetuate hostile work environ-
ments, and effectively nullify legal protections. While data on employ-
ment arbitration outcomes was initially sparse and hidden, it has now
exposed how valuable mandatory arbitration provisions are to employers
and how damaging they are to employees.
As mandatory arbitration provisions became more common, research-
ers initially faced challenges in gathering the data necessary to determine
whether arbitration acted as a fair substitute for litigation or as a boon to
employers.57 Unlike court filings and orders, arbitration filings and reso-
54. See id. at 11.
55. Id.
56. See, e.g., id. at 12 (projecting that if—as occurred recently in Murphy Oil—the
Court “upholds the use of class action waivers in mandatory employment arbitration pro-
cedures, then we should expect a further increase in the use of these class action waivers
and greater numbers of employers overall adopting mandatory arbitration”); see also
CARLTON FIELDS, 2019 CARLTON FIELDS CLASS ACTION SURVEY: BEST PRACTICES IN RE-
DUCING COST AND MANAGING RISK IN CLASS ACTION LITIGATION 3, 5 (2019), https://
classactionsurvey.com/pdf/2019-class-action-survey.pdf [https://perma.cc/6UG5-6X8Q]
(surveying general counsel and senior officers at Fortune 1000 and other large companies
and finding that “[a]s expected, the use of arbitration clauses increased in 2018, and the
percentage of companies that included class action waivers in their arbitration clauses in-
creased to near 50 percent”).
57. See, e.g., Samuel Estreicher, Michael Heise & David S. Sherwyn, Evaluating Em-
ployment Arbitration: A Call for Better Empirical Research, 70 RUTGERS U. L. REV. 375,
375–76 (2018) (“Since at least 1991, issues surrounding mandatory arbitration of employ-
ment and other disputes have intrigued, perplexed, angered, gratified, and confounded
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lutions are private.58 As Professor Cynthia Estlund describes in The
Black Hole of Mandatory Arbitration, “the federal courts are exemplars
of transparency compared to the world of arbitration.”59 While research-
ers could access court filings and orders, they could not access arbitration
filings or resolutions. Thus, comparisons were impossible. However, in
2002, California adopted a statute requiring certain private arbitration
companies to “collect, publish at least quarterly, and make available to
the public in a computer-searchable format” data about its arbitrations
including party names; whether the dispute was employment related;
whether parties were “repeat players” before the private arbitration com-
pany; the amount of claim; the amount of award; and whether other relief
was granted.60
This data would expose that mandatory arbitration provisions and class
action waivers act as “a virtual insurance policy,” effectively indemnifying
employers “against employment claims” whether for wage and hour vio-
lations, sexual harassment, discriminatory practices, or other illegal activi-
ties—”and one that is free, no less.”61 To indemnify a person is to shield
that person against legal liability for their actions. Mandatory arbitration
provisions and class action waivers begin the indemnification process by
causing workers to abandon claims of employer misconduct.
1. Workers Abandon Claims Instead of Arbitrating
In 2018, Professor Cynthia Estlund compared data on the federal and
state lawsuits filed by the 44% of U.S. workers who are not bound by
MAAs and class action waivers with the arbitrations initiated by the 56%
of workers who are bound by these provisions.62 She concluded that, as a
general matter, the 44% of U.S. workers who are able to litigate their
claims in open, public forums do so while the 56% of workers forced into
private arbitration abandon their claims instead of participating in a
rigged system.63
According to Professor Estlund’s study, in 2016 “approximately 31,000
federal lawsuits were filed in five categories of employment cases:” work-
ers sought to enforce their rights under civil rights laws, the Americans
with Disabilities Act, the Fair Labor Standards Act, the Employment Re-
academics, politicians, lawyers, and others. Similar to many legal issues, the first wave of
scholarly work centered on the law. As the law has pretty much settled, academics have
turned to empirical work, focusing on how employment arbitration works, and how it com-
pares to employment litigation. In part due to pressure from California legislation, the
American Arbitration Association (‘AAA’), the nation’s leading provider of arbitration
services, opened access to its data base. Owing to inevitable data limitations, most analyses
have focused on outcomes—comparisons between litigation verdicts/judgments and arbi-
tration awards.” (footnotes omitted)).
58. See infra note 109 and accompanying text.
59. Estlund, supra note 23, at 684.
60. 2002 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 1158 (A.B. 2656) (West) (codified as amended at CAL.
CIV. PROC. CODE § 1281.96(a) (West, Westlaw through Ch. 372 of 2020 Reg. Sess.)).
61. Estlund, supra note 23, at 706.
62. See id. at 691.
63. See id. at 691, 698.
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tirement Income Security Act, and the Family and Medical Leave Act.64
These workers also file an estimated “195,000 employment lawsuits per
year in state courts of general jurisdiction.”65 Many of the federal and
state lawsuits these workers file are “class or collective actions, some of
which might cover hundreds of employees or more.”66 In short, workers
with access to the justice system turn to that system to enforce their
rights.
By stark contrast, workers with access only to mandatory arbitration do
not turn to that system to enforce their rights. A “very large majority of
aggrieved individuals who face the prospect of mandatory arbitration give
up their claims before filing.”67 Crunching the numbers, Estlund con-
cludes that if workers bound by mandatory arbitration provisions sought
resolution of their employment-related disputes as frequently as unbound
workers do, “then we would expect to see between 320,000 and 727,000
employment claims in arbitration.”68 Instead, the American Arbitration
Association, the designated provider in about half of mandatory employ-
ment arbitration provisions, resolves “an average of about 940 cases per
year.”69 If filing rates are similar among other arbitration providers, “that
yields an estimate of fewer than 2,000 employment arbitration cases ter-
minated per year under MAAs.”70
Given these “jaw-dropping disparities in estimated filing rates between
court and arbitration,”71 Estlund concludes that “well under two percent
of the employment claims that one would expect to find in some forum,
but that are covered by MAAs, ever enter the arbitration process.”72
Estlund rightly emphasizes that “[t]he single most striking fact uncov-
ered by the recent studies is the very small number of arbitration cases
that enter the process.”73 As she details, “the presence of a mandatory
arbitration provision dramatically reduces an employee’s chance of secur-
ing legal representation, as well as her chance of any kind of recovery,
any kind of hearing, or any formal complaint being filed on her behalf.”74
Mandatory arbitration provisions simply erase the vast majority of poten-
tially meritorious claims by employees against employers. “All in all, the
available evidence suggests that the overwhelming majority of claims that
64. Id. at 691. The cases were coded in such a way as to limit the count to civil rights
claims and ADA claims brought within the employment context. See id. (counting federal
cases coded “Civil rights: employment” and “ADA [Americans with Disabilities Act]/em-
ployment” (alteration in original)).
65. Id. at 693 (citing E-mail from Mark D. Gough, Assistant Professor, Penn State
Coll. of Liberal Arts, to Cynthia Estlund, Professor, New York Univ. Sch. of L. (Nov. 30,
2017) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review)).
66. Id.
67. Id. at 699.
68. Id. at 696.
69. Id. at 689.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 698.
72. Id. at 696.
73. Id. at 689.
74. Id. at 703 (footnote omitted).
2021] Taxing Employers 73
would have been litigated but for the presence of a[n] MAA are simply
dropped without being filed in any forum at all.”75
A predictable consequence of erasing the overwhelming majority of
potentially meritorious claims against employers is that unscrupulous em-
ployers will act in increasingly egregious and harmful ways. “If the impo-
sition of mandatory arbitration means that the employer faces only a
miniscule chance of ever confronting a formal legal claim in any forum
regarding future legal misconduct against its employees, then such a pro-
vision virtually amounts to an ex ante exculpatory clause,”76 preventing
employers from ever being held liable if they violate wage and hour laws,
fail to provide legally required accommodations for employees with disa-
bilities, or engage in unlawful harassment or other discrimination against
their workers. From the worker’s perspective, becoming subject to an em-
ployer-imposed MAA acts as an “ex ante waiver of substantive rights that
the law declares non-waivable.”77 Although statutes purport to protect
workers’ rights, any avenue for effective enforcement has been waived.78
Professor Estlund’s findings that mandatory arbitration prevents the
overwhelming majority of workers’ claims from ever being filed make
less relevant how the few claims actually filed fare in arbitration: “For all
the sound and fury about skewed outcomes, repeat player effects, biased
arbitrators, limited discovery, and lack of adherence to or production of
precedent in arbitration, it turns out that, except for a relative handful of
cases, arbitration does not take place at all.”79 Professor Estlund calls this
“the black hole of mandatory arbitration.”80
Unfortunately, the few claims that workers actually advance in arbitra-
tion fare poorly. This is unsurprising because the rules applicable to em-
ployer-imposed arbitration proceedings are written by the employer. As
Professors Katherine Stone and Alexander Colvin explain, arbitration is
private, often relaxes the rules of evidence, often limits discovery, adjusts
the “amount of due process provided to the participants,” and follows
rules written by the drafter of the arbitration provision.81 “The arbitra-
tion agreement itself is the primary source of the rules governing the arbi-
tration process. The parties to this private agreement are generally
allowed to write into the arbitration clause whatever rules they wish to
govern how disputes will be resolved.”82 While such a system seems to
75. Id. at 698.
76. Id. at 703.
77. Id.
78. See, e.g., Judith Resnik, Diffusing Disputes: The Public in the Private of Arbitra-
tion, the Private in Courts, and the Erasure of Rights, 124 YALE L.J. 2804, 2936 (2015); Jean
R. Sternlight, Disarming Employees: How American Employers Are Using Mandatory Ar-
bitration to Deprive Workers of Legal Protection, 80 BROOK. L. REV. 1309, 1328–29 (2015);
J. Maria Glover, Disappearing Claims and the Erosion of Substantive Law, 124 YALE L.J.
3052, 3091–92 (2015).
79. Estlund, supra note 23, at 699–700 (footnote omitted).
80. Id. at 700.
81. STONE & COLVIN, supra note 21, at 17.
82. Id.
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uphold freedom of contract principles, “[i]n practice this means that the
corporation that chooses to make arbitration mandatory for its workers
. . . will write the rules of the procedure, and the worker . . . will have no
choice but to assent if [the employer] want[s] to enter into an employ-
ment . . . transaction.”83 Employers are legally empowered and incen-
tivized to draft arbitration provisions that favor their own interests and
disadvantage their employees.
Employers use many provisions in their unilaterally imposed MAAs to
disadvantage their workers. For example, they include
provisions that would bar the claim altogether (like a very short limi-
tations period or unaffordable arbitrator fees), or impede investiga-
tion (like very limited discovery), or sharply skew proceedings
against the complainant (like a biased arbitrator pool or a skewed
selection process), or curtail recovery even in the event of “success”
(like provisions against attorney fee shifting or punitive damages, or
damage limits).84
Provisions like these, which intentionally erode the safeguards provided
to workers in the civil justice system, are sometimes enforced and occa-
sionally voided. However, even when they are voided, they still threaten
to mislead employees into underestimating their chances of success and
advantage the employers who strategically include them in their
mandatory arbitration provisions. Even the most egregious provisions
“are likely to be struck or amended from an agreement rather than invali-
dating the agreement. As a result, firms get the benefit of the arbitration
agreement despite any overreaching.”85 The consequences are predict-
able. Existing law “tempts unscrupulous firms to ‘go for it’—to include
knowingly unfair or invalid provisions that are likely to discourage many
complainants and their attorneys from pursuing a case at all, with little or
no downside risk in case the overreach is detected and corrected.”86 Em-
ployers continue to use even unenforceable dispute resolution terms to
chill employees who might otherwise bring meritorious claims. “Legally
objectionable arbitration clauses and procedures, as well as vague and
indeterminate ones, can deter both litigation and arbitration, especially
by plaintiffs in relatively small-dollar cases.”87 In sum, “companies have
every incentive to draft their [mandatory arbitration] agreements to ex-
tract backdoor waivers of statutory rights.”88
Abstracting from particular terms, arbitration has many aspects that
inherently favor employers: “[A]rbitration is a privately created, do-it-
yourself tribunal, which rarely provides rights to discovery, compulsory
process, cross examination, or other due process protections common to
83. Id.
84. Estlund, supra note 23, at 700–01.
85. Id. at 701.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 702.
88. Id. at 704 (quoting Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 570 U.S. 228, 244
(2013) (Kagan, J. dissenting)).
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civil trials.”89 Workers who advance claims of employer wrongdoing bear
the burden of proving their claims and are impeded in that effort by not
having discovery, compulsory process, cross-examination, or other fact-
finding tools. Further, data indicates that arbitration favors repeat-player
employers over one-time player employees, favors the employers who
choose and compensate the arbitrator, and deprives employees of safe-
guards of the civil justice system.90 These features create a vicious cycle
wherein the few claims brought by workers in employer-imposed
mandatory arbitration result in worker-unfavorable outcomes and cause
even fewer claims to be brought in the future.91
Of critical importance for the purposes of this Article is Professor Es-
tlund’s conclusion that mandatory arbitration provisions, class action
waivers, and nondisclosure of dispute resolution provisions have become
“a mechanism for employers’ unilateral dissolution of inalienable sub-
stantive rights.”92 As she anticipates, “[a] skeptic might respond: If
MAAs did represent a virtual insurance policy against employment
claims—and one that is free, no less—then why wouldn’t all employers
impose such agreements?”93 And to this she responds, “I fear that may
be exactly where we are headed, albeit more slowly than one might have
expected. And the lag in adoption of MAAs might be traceable to the
obscurity surrounding mandatory arbitration and the long quest for relia-
ble empirical data on its impact.”94 Employers are likely to impose
mandatory arbitration provisions more frequently and more broadly than
ever before. As employers increasingly obtain intangible assets that are
akin to free insurance policies shielding them from their employees’ po-
tentially meritorious claims, labor law has provided an insufficient check.
Labor law’s potential to respond was further eroded by the Supreme
Court’s ruling in Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis.95
2. Workers Do Not Win Claims in Arbitration
In the rare instances in which employees proceed with arbitrations de-
signed and imposed by their very employers instead of abandoning their
89. Stone, supra note 31, at 1046.
90. See, e.g., Ronald Turner, The FAA, the NLRA, and Epic Systems’ Epic Fail, 98
TEX. L. REV. ONLINE 17, 18 (2019); Forced Arbitration Hearings, supra note 1, at 4 (state-
ment of Deepak Gupta, Founding Principal, Gupta Wessler PLLC); id. at 2, 15 (statement
of Myriam Gilles, Professor, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law).
91. For example, economically rational plaintiffs’ attorneys refuse to take these cases
on a contingency-fee basis. See STONE & COLVIN, supra note 21, at 21 (“The mandatory
arbitration–litigation outcome gap has a significant and pernicious effect on the ability [of
employees] to obtain legal counsel under . . . contingency-fee arrangements. . . .
[A]ttorneys decide whether to accept a case based on their judgment about the likely out-
come. But as we have seen, the average outcome is substantially lower in mandatory arbi-
tration than it is for litigation.”).
92. Estlund, supra note 23, at 705.
93. Id. at 706.
94. Id.
95. See 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1619 (2018).
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claims, employees tend to lose.96 Professor Alexander Colvin found that
 [e]mployee win rates in mandatory arbitration are much lower
than in either federal court or state court, with employees in
mandatory arbitration winning only just about a fifth of the time
(21.4 percent), which is 59 percent as often as in the federal courts
and only 38 percent as often as in state courts.97
Employers write the rules of arbitration, and then they win.98
3. When Workers Win, They Win Little
In the rare arbitration that results in a worker winning, the worker wins
little: “[T]he median or typical award [to a worker] in mandatory arbitra-
tion [is] only 21 percent of the median award in the federal courts and 43
percent of the median award in the state courts.”99
Taking lower win rates and lower damages together shows how disad-
vantageous arbitration is for workers.
96. See, e.g., STONE & COLVIN, supra note 21, at 3 (“By delegating dispute resolution
to arbitration, the Court now permits corporations to write the rules that will govern their
relationships with their workers and customers and design the procedures used to interpret
and apply those rules when disputes arise.”); Resnik, supra note 78, at 2808 (“To assume
the result is ‘mass arbitration’ is to misunderstand how the provisions function; few who
are cut off from using the courts and required (rather than choosing) to arbitrate do so,
thereby erasing as well as diffusing disputes.”); Kathleen McCullough, Note, Mandatory
Arbitration and Sexual Harassment Claims: #MeToo-and Time’s Up-Inspired Action
Against the Federal Arbitration Act, 87 FORDHAM L. REV. 2653, 2658–59 (2019)
(“Mandatory arbitration agreements can have major drawbacks for employees. Critics of
mandatory arbitration suggest that employees are less likely to prevail in arbitration and,
even if they do prevail, often recover less than they would through litigation. Mandatory
arbitration may suppress meritorious claims and limit publicly accessible information due
to nondisclosure agreements, which are often part of arbitration settlements.” (footnotes
omitted)).
97. STONE & COLVIN, supra note 21, at 19.
98. Sternlight, supra note 30, at 188–89 (“Employment arbitrators are trying to make a
living, which they do by being hired and rehired by disputants. They therefore may not
want to write creative progressive decisions that present a greater risk of getting vacated.
Such an outcome could annoy current disputants and discourage others from hiring that
arbitrator in the future. More specifically, such an outcome could displease the employer
disputant, to the detriment of the arbitrator. Employers, particularly large corporate em-
ployers, are repeat players who frequently hire arbitrators in multiple cases; individual
employees may dispute only a single claim over the course of a lifetime and thus have less
market influence.” (footnotes omitted)); McCullough, supra note 96, at 2659 (“Employers
may have a significant advantage in the arbitration process because they often choose the
applicable procedures and select the arbitrators. Employers also have a ‘repeat player’
advantage because they are familiar with the system and may deal with the same arbitrator
multiple times, which also creates the potential for unconscious bias in their favor.” (foot-
note omitted)).
99. See STONE & COLVIN, supra note 21, at 19–20 (citing Alexander J.S. Colvin, An
Empirical Study of Employment Arbitration: Case Outcomes and Processes, 8 J. EMPIRICAL
LEGAL STUD. 1–23 at 5 (2011); Theodore Eisenberg & Elizabeth Hill, Arbitration and Liti-
gation of Employment Claims: An Empirical Comparison, 58 DISP. RESOL. J. 44–55
(2004)); Estlund, supra note 23, at 688–89 (“[E]mployees who did win something recovered
much less in AAA arbitration than in litigation: The median award was $36,500 in arbitra-
tion versus $176,426 in federal discrimination cases, $85,560 in state non-civil rights em-
ployment cases, and $355,843 in California wrongful discharge cases.”).
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The most comprehensive comparison comes when we look at the
mean or average amount recovered in damages across all cases, in-
cluding those in which the employee loses and zero damages are
awarded. When we make this comparison, we find that the average
outcome in mandatory arbitration is only 16 percent of that in the
federal courts and 7 percent of that in state courts.100
In sum, “mandatory arbitration is massively less favorable to employees
than are the courts.”101 A study by the Economic Policy Institute simi-
larly found that
plaintiffs’ overall economic outcomes are on average 6.1 times better
in federal court than in mandatory arbitration ($143,497 versus
$23,548) and 13.9 times better in state court than in mandatory arbi-
tration ($328,008 versus $23,548). These are very large differences in
outcomes, and attempts to explain away this gap have been largely
unsuccessful.102
The available data shows that arbitration is good for employers and bad
for employees.103
4. Labor Laws Go Unenforced by Any Tribunal
Nearly twenty-five years ago—and well before the dramatic expansions
of mandatory arbitration and class action waivers—Professor Katherine
Stone warned of the harms of these provisions:
courts should not permit workers to waive their rights under state or
federal employment statutes. That is, courts should not force parties
to arbitrate statutory claims, should not presume that promises to
arbitrate include promises to arbitrate statutory claims, and should
not give arbitral rulings on statutory issues preclusive effect. To do
otherwise threatens to nullify the past sixty years’ development of
workers’ rights and will make it difficult to legislate effective worker
protection in the future.104
100. See STONE & COLVIN, supra note 21, at 19.
101. Id. The lower win rate and lower damage awards in arbitration do not appear to be
explained by employees bringing weaker cases in arbitration, because summary judgment
dismissal is less common in arbitration. See id. at 20 (“Looking at [a] subsample of cases in
arbitration and litigation where there was no summary judgment motion, Colvin and
Gough found that the win rate was 32 percent lower in mandatory arbitration than in
litigation. This result indicates that the gap in outcomes cannot be explained away as an
effect of greater use of summary judgment motions in litigation.” (citing ALEXANDER J.S.
COLVIN & MARK D. GOUGH, COMPARING MANDATORY ARBITRATION AND LITIGATION:
ACCESS, PROCESS, AND OUTCOMES (2014), https://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/cgi/view
content.cgi?article=1059&context=reports [https://perma.cc/HQ3W-QTSW])).
102. Id. at 21.
103. See id. (“The mandatory arbitration–litigation gap in outcomes has a direct effect
on the ability of individual workers to recover compensation for the injuries they have
suffered. The gap also reduces the liability exposure of corporations that adopt mandatory
arbitration. However, equally important, the mandatory arbitration–litigation gap has a
major impact on the ability of workers to make claims in the first place.”).
104. Stone, supra note 31, at 1020.
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She warned that mandatory arbitration provisions would effectively strip
workers of their statutory rights and thus harm workers who are subject
to wage theft and unlawful discrimination particularly.105
Workers’ rights organizations have similarly sounded the alarm:
[I]n a joint statement to the Commission on the Future of Worker-
Management Relations, several organizations representing working
women, including 9 to 5, the National Association of Working Wo-
men, the American Nurses Association, and the Coalition of Labor
Union Women, decried the “alarming trend toward using mandatory
arbitration to reduce employment-related litigation.” These groups
feared in particular that Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) was
being used “as a means of eroding the hard-fought legal protections
women have against inequitable treatment in the workplace . . . (es-
pecially) in the area of sexual harassment.”106
These organizations objected to the manner in which employers imposed
these terms, arguing that “employers should not be able to coerce indi-
vidual workers, particularly women workers who are not protected by a
union, at the onset of an employment relationship or at any time thereaf-
ter, to choose between their statutory rights to be free of discrimination
and their jobs.”107
Unfortunately, courts did not heed this warning. To the contrary,
mandatory arbitration provisions and class action waivers have received
ever stronger approval by courts.108 Predictably, these terms have be-
come far more common in response to this approval.
5. Labor Laws Go Unenforced by Sunlight
Mandatory arbitration provisions protect employers who violate wage
and hour laws, labor laws, sexual harassment laws, and discrimination
laws from being exposed to prospective employees, business partners,
customers, and the public. As Professor Katherine Van Wezel Stone ex-
plains, this is by design:
arbitral decisions are invisible documents—they do not receive me-
dia attention or public scrutiny and therefore engender no public de-
bate. Arbitrators are not public officials, not accountable to a larger
public, nor required to apply public law. And there is no legislative
arena in which unpopular decisional trends can be challenged. Arbi-
tration is a privatized forum, designed by the parties, and out of the
public eye.109
105. See id.
106. Id. at 1047 (second alteration in original) (footnote omitted) (quoting Fact Finding
Report: Hearing Before the Commission on the Future of Worker–Management Relations,
102d Cong. 24–26 (1994) (statement of 9 to 5)).
107. Id. (quoting Fact Finding Report: Hearing Before the Commission on the Future of
Worker–Management Relations, 102d Cong. 24–26 (1994) (statement of 9 to 5)).
108. See Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1619 (2018).
109. Stone, supra note 31, at 1046–47 (footnote omitted).
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By shielding themselves from exposure to current and prospective em-
ployees, business contacts, and the public, employers gain significant ad-
vantage through the use of arbitration. Some employers highly value
secrecy.
Unfortunately, while sunlight on employer wrongdoing can bring about
change, darkness fosters growth. For example, the New York Times re-
ported on long-standing and rampant sexual harassment at the employer
Sterling Jewelers, which owns Kay Jewelers and Jared the Galleria of
Jewelry.110 The victims of harassment reported that their employer’s
mandatory arbitration provision prevented prospective employees, cus-
tomers, and the public from responding to the offensive conduct by boy-
cotting or otherwise pressuring change.111 The provision also prevented
victims from discovering that their experiences were part of a pattern of
abuse and from proving that pattern to the arbitrator.112 As employees
who were victims of harassment explained,
all the employees had signed a mandatory arbitration agreement in
the flood of paperwork that accompanied their hiring at Sterling—
everyone did at the time. Arbitration meant that instead of being
heard in a public court, they had to proceed privately in Sterling’s in-
house system, called Resolve. The first step of Resolve was an inter-
nal investigation. If the employee wasn’t satisfied by the results of
that investigation, he or she could ask to be heard by a panel of the
employee’s peers and an employment lawyer, all selected by Sterling.
If the employee was still dissatisfied, the case was sent to arbitration.
Sterling paid the arbitrator. The hearing’s proceedings . . . were done
in private, and their outcome was sealed. Afterward, if there was a
settlement, the employee often had to sign a nondisclosure agree-
ment that prohibited the employee from speaking about the case
again.113
Sterling designed an arbitration process to benefit itself, and—as the arti-
cle concludes—perhaps the most significant “benefit to the company was
that” meritorious sexual harassment claims were “resolved in secret. The
secrecy was the point.”114
Workers’ rights advocates argue that if employers are not publicly ex-
posed for their wrongdoing, the wrongdoing is perpetuated. Indeed, they
argue that employers should be exposed and boycotted not just for har-
assment, discrimination, wage and hour violations, and other labor law
violations but also for imposing mandatory arbitration terms on their em-
ployees because the harm of mandatory arbitration is so extreme.115





115. See, e.g., Katherine V. Stone, Signing Away Our Rights, AM. PROSPECT (Mar. 5,
2011), https://prospect.org/features/signing-away-rights/ [https://perma.cc/2BE6-YR3H]
(“[W]ith a Republican majority, [federal legislative] reform is virtually dead for the fore-
seeable future. The other way to slow the arbitration express is for consumer and worker
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C. HARMS TO WORKERS GENERALLY
Individual suits for wage and hour violations are inefficient, which par-
tially explains why coercive employment dispute resolution terms often
bar class actions116: “The ban on class actions in particular makes it un-
likely that many claims of corporate wrongdoing—particularly those that
involve small sums for each in large groups of individuals—will ever be
heard.”117 Further, “[a]s Justice Breyer opined, ‘Only a lunatic or a fa-
natic sues for $30.’”118 Lack of an effective remedy makes wage theft
easier, more common, and worse.119
Discrimination and sexual harassment suits often require proof of pat-
terns of conduct, which partially explains why coercive employment dis-
pute resolution terms often bar class actions and require confidentiality.
An important component of justice for workers treated unlawfully is ex-
groups to publicize the names of corporations that demand compulsory arbitration and
class-action bans and to call upon the public to stop doing business with them. If Congress
won’t act, this abuse cries out for collective citizen action.”); see also, e.g., Coercive Con-
tracts, supra note 16 (exposing law firms who impose coercive employment terms on their
employees).
116. See STONE & COLVIN, supra note 21, at 26–27; see also Sternlight, supra note 30, at
183–84 (“When vulnerable employees’ claims are weaker, . . . they will more likely be
suppressed, because lawyers will not be eager to take the claims and because individual
employees will hesitate to file them on their own. If the claims also cannot be brought in
class actions, that augments the problem. So, when the claims of the most vulnerable em-
ployees are shunted to arbitration they become even more difficult to bring than would
otherwise be the case.”).
117. STONE & COLVIN, supra note 21, at 26; see also Myriam Gilles & Gary Friedman,
After Class: Aggregate Litigation in the Wake of AT&T Mobility v Concepcion, 79 U. CHI.
L. REV. 623, 629–30 (2012) (“[M]ost class cases will not survive the impending tsunami of
class action waivers. And as this great mass of . . . employment . . . and other cases is swept
out to sea, the question arises: What or who can fill the resulting enforcement gap?”);
Myriam Gilles, Opting Out of Liability: The Forthcoming, Near-Total Demise of the Mod-
ern Class Action, 104 MICH. L. REV. 373, 419–20 (2005) (“While arbitration of employment
disputes is nothing new (and some scholars have staunchly defended the use [of] arbitra-
tion in the employment context) the potential for collective action waivers to curtail most,
if not all, employment class actions seeking broad-scale changes in the U.S. workplace is a
more recent phenomenon. Aggressive employers such as Circuit City have already used
collective action waivers to avoid classwide exposure in the employment context. Broker-
age houses, which have recently paid out high settlements to avoid jury trials in gender-
discrimination cases, have long used arbitration clauses to shield themselves from classwide
liability in employment claims; one would expect these entities to soon add collective ac-
tion waivers to ensure their immunity. And the newfound ability of employers to notify
employees of arbitration clauses via mass emails will make it far easier to impose these
waivers.” (footnotes omitted)).
118. STONE & COLVIN, supra note 21, at 26 (quoting AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concep-
cion, 563 U.S. 333, 365 (2011) (Breyer, J., dissenting)).
119. See id. at 13 (“[T]he arbitration law trends may signal the destruction of the legal
protection for collective action that has been at the heart of labor laws for over 60 years.”);
Gilles, supra note 36, at 867 (“[I]ndividually risking so much for so little makes no sense.
More important than costs are attorneys’ fees. Class actions happen because lawyers ad-
vance their time and fees, and they are not going to do that unless they can recover from
sufficiently large numbers of people to make it worthwhile.” (footnote omitted)); Gilles,
supra note 117, at 378 (“[S]ound public policy requires collective litigation be available for
small-claim plaintiffs who would not have the incentive or resources to remedy harms or
deter wrongdoing in one-on-one proceedings.”).
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posure of the employer’s wrongdoing and a public judicial sanction.120
D. HARMS TO VULNERABLE WORKERS PARTICULARLY
One need only look at the laws that workers seek to enforce—wage
and hour laws, sexual harassment laws, antidiscrimination laws, reasona-
ble accommodation laws—to see that coercive employment dispute reso-
lution terms disproportionately harm lower-paid, racial-minority, female,
LGBTQIA+, physically impaired, and vulnerable workers.
Indeed, it is not just that vulnerable workers are more likely to have
their potentially meritorious claims barred by mandatory arbitration pro-
visions; they are also more likely to be subject to mandatory arbitration
provisions in the first place.121 In its survey on the use of mandatory arbi-
tration provisions, the Economic Policy Institute considered that “[s]ince
the proportion of female and racial and ethnic minority employees varies
significantly across industries, we can also look at whether the rate of
imposition of mandatory arbitration varies with the composition of the
workforce in the industry.”122 It did—and in troublingly predictable ways.
For example, “[c]onstruction, an industry with a predominantly male
workforce, has the lowest rate of imposition of mandatory arbitration,
whereas education and health, industries with a more predominantly fe-
male workforce, have the highest rate of imposition of mandatory
arbitration.”123
Similar industry-based comparisons indicate that African-American
workers are more likely to be subject to mandatory arbitration than are
their white peers.124 Employer surveys indicate that “59.1 percent of Afri-
can-American workers” while “55.6 percent of white, non-Hispanic work-
ers . . . are subject to mandatory arbitration.”125 Unfortunately, “overall,
female workers (at 57.6 percent) and African-American workers (at 59.1
percent) are the most likely to be subject to mandatory arbitration.”126
120. See, e.g., Stacy Perman, #MeToo Law Restricts Use of Nondisclosure Agreements in
Sexual Misconduct Cases, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 31, 2018, 3:00 AM), https://www.latimes.com/
business/hollywood/la-fi-ct-nda-hollywood-20181231-story.html [https://perma.cc/C8M4-
C6G3] (“[O]nce investigations into [Harvey] Weinstein turned up claims of rape in Octo-
ber 2017, [his former assistant Zelda] Perkins was forced to reconsider the [settlement she
had negotiated, which contained a nondisclosure provision forbidding her from discussing
Weinstein’s sexual harassment of her]. ‘I was just so angry and frustrated, and I wasn’t
allowed to speak to anybody about what happened,’ she told the Los Angeles Times. Al-
though she faced crushing legal and financial repercussions if she went public, ‘I felt I had
an absolute moral duty to break this agreement.’”).
121. See Sternlight, supra note 30, at 183 (“Compared to litigation, mandatory arbitra-
tion makes it harder for employees to secure legal representation, harder for employees to
participate in class actions, and it remains hard for employees to bring or prevail on claims
brought pro se. While these burdens affect all employees, they fall most heavily on the
most vulnerable members of society.” (footnotes omitted)).
122. COLVIN, supra note 19, at 8.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 9.
125. Id.
126. Id.
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Finally, lower-paid workers are more likely to be subject to mandatory
arbitration provisions than are higher-paid workers. “It is the employers
with the lowest-paid workforces that are most likely to impose mandatory
arbitration on their employees. This is a concern from a policy perspec-
tive because low-paid employees are particularly vulnerable to infringe-
ments of their employment rights . . . [including] widespread violations of
wage and hour laws.”127
E. HARMS TO THE SOCIETY AND THE RULE OF LAW
While some harms of mandatory arbitration and other coercive em-
ployment dispute resolution terms are borne primarily by employees—
and particularly vulnerable employees—others are borne by society gen-
erally through the erosion of the rule of law, failure to enforce state and
federal statutes, lack of transparency, and offense to fairness.
An amicus brief filed by several state attorneys general in the Epic
Systems case explains that mandatory arbitration provisions impede en-
forcement of democratically enacted laws, like the Fair Labor Standards
Act, thereby widening a gap in enforcement that states are already under-
resourced to fill.128 As these amici argued, state and federal laws are
statements of shared community values, expressed through a democratic
process.129 The failure to enforce these laws is an offense to the rule of
law and to the results of our democratic processes. As one arbitration
scholar candidly asks, “If Congress passes laws that can’t be enforced in
the real world, what good are those laws?”130
Additionally, mandatory arbitration provisions erode the strength and
accuracy of our common law system. Just as taking data points out of a
marketplace leads to a less efficient marketplace, taking court rulings out
127. Id.
128. See Brief of Maryland et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents in Nos. 16-
285 and 16-300 and Petitioner in No. 16-307 at 2–6, Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct.
1612 (2018) (Nos. 16-285,16-300, 16-307), 2017 WL 3588729, at *2–6.
129. See id.
130. Forced Arbitration Hearings, supra note 1, at 2 (statement of Deepak Gupta,
Founding Principal, Gupta Wessler PLLC). See generally G. Richard Shell, ERISA and
Other Federal Employment Statutes: When Is Commercial Arbitration an “Adequate Substi-
tute” for the Courts?, 68 TEX. L. REV. 509, 568 (1990) (“Title VII is not only a remedial
statute, it is an attempt to address a systemic social ill—discrimination—that is deeply em-
bedded in the cultural fabric. The adjudication of a Title VII claim is both an opportunity
to reverse an instance of discrimination and an occasion for examining the institutions that
made discrimination possible. The Court . . . recognized this aspect of Title VII when it
stated that ‘the private litigant not only redresses his own injury but also vindicates the
important congressional policy against discriminatory practices.’ Commercial arbitration is
not well situated to serve this institutional goal because it is essentially transactional in
focus.”) (footnote omitted) (quoting Alexander v. Gardner–Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 45
(1974)); id. at 570 (“[A]dministrative hearing officers must render written opinions con-
taining rulings of law, thus subjecting them to the sort of rigorous ‘legal discipline’ in their
thinking that is missing from commercial arbitration decisional processes. . . . The institu-
tions of commercial arbitration have demonstrated neither the historical ability nor the
desire to resolve disputes [involving rights to personal dignity and equal protection] so
close to the core of our Nation’s values.”).
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of the common law system will lead to a less tried, less tested body of case
law.131
Finally, the secrecy of mandatory arbitration prevents exposure of em-
ployer misconduct and makes society less safe. For example, “[s]ecret set-
tlements in sexual assault and related cases can jeopardize the public—
including other potential victims—and allow perpetrators to escape jus-
tice . . . . These secret settlements in workplace and other settings can
ultimately endanger the public by hiding sexual predators from law en-
forcement and the public.”132
III. EXISTING LAW DICTATES THAT COERCIVE
EMPLOYMENT DISPUTE RESOLUTION TERMS BE
UPHELD
Unfortunately, although mandatory arbitration and other coercive em-
ployment dispute resolution terms are extremely harmful, the U.S. Su-
preme Court sides with employers who impose them. In 2018, a 5–4
decision by the Court resolved a circuit split to hold that mandatory arbi-
tration provisions, class action waivers, and nondisclosure provisions uni-
laterally imposed by employers on their employees do not violate the
National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) and are enforceable.133 This Part
describes how Epic Systems reversed contrary rulings of the Seventh and
Ninth Circuits to uphold coercive employment dispute resolution terms
and pave the way for these terms to become even more common.
In Lewis v. Epic Systems Corp., the Seventh Circuit held that coercive
dispute resolution terms in employment contracts were unenforceable be-
cause they violate the NLRA’s protection of employees’ right to engage
in concerted activities, including “collective, representative, or class legal
131. See Gupta & Khan, supra note 35, at 499–500 (“Cases that previously would have
been litigated and publicly recorded are now either diverted to a private arbitrator or not
brought at all.”); Resnik, supra note 78, at 2855 (“[F]rom arbitration dockets . . . one em-
ployee cannot generally know if another succeeded on discrimination or on other claims of
rights.”); Sternlight, supra note 30, at 181 (“Turning to the impact of mandatory arbitration
on society more generally, critics have long worried that requiring employees to arbitrate
rather than litigate claims will undermine the force of law not only by suppressing claims,
but also by requiring claims to be heard privately and limiting easy access to precedent.”);
Forced Arbitration Hearings, supra note 1, at 10 (statement of Myriam Gilles, Professor,
Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law) (“Class-banning forced arbitration clauses . . . under-
mine the principles central to the rule of law, such as stare decisis and the development of
legal precedents.”); Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1085–87 (1984)
(arguing that even when settlements are voluntarily agreed to go through a dispute resolu-
tion process that was mutually adopted after the dispute arose, settlement weakens the
common law system by depriving it of data points and precedent). The weight of this harm
should be viewed as far higher when the common law system is deprived of data points and
precedent by arbitration outcomes that are dependent on a process that was not mutually
agreed to but instead unilaterally imposed before the dispute even arose.
132. Michelle Kaminsky, The Harvey Weinstein Effect: The End of Nondisclosure
Agreements in Sexual Assault Cases?, FORBES (Oct. 26, 2017, 1:00 PM), https://
www.forbes.com/sites/michellefabio/2017/10/26/the-harvey-weinstein-effect-the-end-of-
nondisclosure-agreements-in-sexual-assault-cases/#21389a5a2c11 [https://perma.cc/SWR5-
3FEF] (quoting California state senator Connie Leyva).
133. Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1632 (2018).
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proceeding[s].”134 Similarly, in Ernst & Young LLP v. Morris, the Ninth
Circuit held that provisions requiring employees to arbitrate “only as in-
dividuals and in ‘separate proceedings’” signed as a condition of employ-
ment were unenforceable against employees initiating class-action wage
and hour litigation because the NLRA protects employee engagement in
collective action and makes its protections non-waivable.135 On the other
side of the split, the Fifth Circuit held in Murphy Oil USA, Inc. v. NLRB
that mandatory arbitration provisions imposed by employers as a condi-
tion of employment were enforceable and protected by the Federal Arbi-
tration Act.136 The Supreme Court granted certiorari in each of these
three cases137 and consolidated them into Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis.138
The way Epic Systems imposed its arbitration provision and class ac-
tion waiver are illustrative. As the Seventh Circuit described,
On April 2, 2014, Epic Systems sent an email to some of its employ-
ees. The email contained an arbitration agreement mandating that
wage-and-hour claims could be brought only through individual arbi-
tration and that the employees waived “the right to participate in or
receive money or any other relief from any class, collective, or repre-
sentative proceeding.” The agreement . . . also said that employees
were “deemed to have accepted this Agreement” if they “con-
tinue[d] to work at Epic.” Epic gave employees no option to decline
134. Lewis v. Epic Sys. Corp., 823 F.3d 1147, 1155 (7th Cir. 2016) (“Epic’s clause [man-
dating individual arbitration of employment-related disputes] runs straight into the teeth of
Section 7 [of the NLRA]. The [individual arbitration] provision prohibits any collective,
representative, or class legal proceeding. Section 7 provides that ‘[e]mployees shall have
the right to . . . engage in . . . concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or
other mutual aid or protection.’ A collective, representative, or class legal proceeding is
just such a ‘concerted activit[y].’ Under Section 8, any employer action that ‘interfere[s]
with, restrain[s], or coerce[s] employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in [Section
7]’ constitutes an ‘unfair labor practice.’ Contracts that stipulate away employees’ Section 7
rights or otherwise require actions unlawful under the NRLA are unenforceable.”) (fourth
through ninth alterations in original) (citations omitted), rev’d, 138 S. Ct. 1612 (2018); id. at
1152 (“Contracts ‘stipulat[ing] . . . the renunciation by the employees of rights guaranteed
by the [NLRA]’ are unlawful and may be declared to be unenforceable by the Board.”
(alterations in original)).
135. Morris v. Ernst & Young, LLP, 834 F.3d 975, 979 (9th Cir. 2016), rev’d sub nom.
Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612 (2018), vacated, 894 F.3d 1093 (9th Cir. 2018)
(later reversed and vacated Ninth Circuit opinion finding unenforceable an arbitration pro-
vision requiring separate, individualized arbitration proceedings for wage and hour dis-
putes); id. at 984 (“The Federal Arbitration Act (‘FAA’) does not dictate a contrary result.
The ‘separate proceedings’ provision in this case appears in an agreement that directs em-
ployment-related disputes to arbitration. But the arbitration requirement is not the prob-
lem. The same provision in a contract that required court adjudication as the exclusive
remedy would equally violate the NLRA. The NLRA obstacle is a ban on initiating, in any
forum, concerted legal claims—not a ban on arbitration.”); id. at 986 (“The FAA does not
mandate the enforcement of contract terms that waive substantive federal rights. Thus,
when an arbitration contract professes the waiver of a substantive federal right, the FAA’s
saving clause prevents a conflict between the statutes by causing the FAA’s enforcement
mandate to yield.”).
136. Murphy Oil USA, Inc. v. NLRB, 808 F.3d 1013, 1015 (5th Cir. 2015), aff’d sub
nom. Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612 (2018).
137. 137 S. Ct. 809 (mem.) (granting certiorari in Epic Systems; Ernst & Young, LLP;
and Murphy Oil USA, Inc.).
138. 138 S. Ct. 1612 (2018).
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if they wanted to keep their jobs. The email requested that recipients
review the agreement and acknowledge their agreement by clicking
two buttons. The following day, Jacob Lewis, then a “technical
writer” at Epic, followed those instructions for registering his
agreement.139
Like many employers, Epic Systems imposed mandatory individual ar-
bitration on its workforce to prevent employees from bringing their dis-
putes collectively in an open, public forum without a meaningful
opportunity for employees to opt out and without any assertion that em-
ployees were provided additional compensation or other consideration in
exchange for the coercive employment term.140 Employees were deemed
to consent to mandatory arbitration, class action waiver, and nondisclo-
sure of dispute resolution provisions simply by continuing to work after
receiving notice of them.141 Nonetheless, the Supreme Court held that
Epic Systems’s individual arbitration provision was enforceable, as were
the coercive employment dispute resolution terms imposed by the other
employers in the consolidated cases Ernst & Young and Murphy Oil.142
The five-Justice majority in Epic Systems held that § 7 of the NLRA,
which protects employee engagement in certain “concerted activities”
like collective bargaining and union formation, does not protect class ac-
tion or other litigation activities.143 In its view, “Section 7 doesn’t speak
to class and collective action procedures in the first place.”144 Next, the
majority held that if the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) decides the
matter instead of the NLRA, “this Court held decades ago that . . . [the
139. Lewis, 823 F.3d at 1151 (second alteration in original).
140. See Epic Sys. Corp., 138 S. Ct. at 1619–20 (“The agreement also specified individ-
ual arbitration, with claims ‘pertaining to different [e]mployees [to] be heard in separate
proceedings.’” (alterations in original)). See generally Morris v. Ernst & Young LLP, No.
C–12–04964 RMW, 2013 WL 3460052, at *1 (N.D. Cal. July 9, 2013) (“McDaniel began her
employment at EY on October 1, 2008. McDaniel’s signed offer letter included a copy of
EY’s Arbitration Agreement, and provided therein that . . . all employment-related dis-
putes would be subject to the Agreement’s mandatory mediation or arbitration provisions.
In addition, McDaniel signed a confidentiality agreement that incorporated by reference
the terms of the Arbitration Agreement. Morris began his employment at EY in January
2005. In March and April of 2006, EY sent an email to all employees attaching a copy of its
‘revised’ Arbitration Agreement, and stating therein that ‘An Employee indicates his or
her agreement to the [Dispute Resolution] Program and is bound by its terms and condi-
tions by beginning or continuing employment with the firm after May [25], 2006.’ EY as-
serts that the plaintiffs are bound by the Arbitration Agreement based on their express
(McDaniel) or implied (Morris) acceptance of its terms.”) (alterations in original) (cita-
tions omitted), rev’d, 834 F.3d 975 (9th Cir. 2016), rev’d sub nom. Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis,
138 S. Ct. 1612 (2018).
141. See Morris, 2013 WL 3460052, at *1 (establishing that employee Morris was bound
by mandatory individual arbitration provision simply by “continuing employment” after
receiving notice of the provision).
142. Epic Sys. Corp., 138 S. Ct. at 1619–20.
143. 29 U.S.C. § 157; Epic Sys. Corp., 138 S. Ct. at 1628 (“Nothing in our cases indicates
that the NLRA guarantees class and collective action procedures, let alone for claims aris-
ing under different statutes despite the express (and entirely unmentioned) teachings of
the Arbitration Act.”).
144. Epic Sys. Corp., 138 S. Ct. at 1626; see also id. at 1625 (“[M]issing entirely from
[the NLRA’s] careful regime is any hint about what rules should govern the adjudication of
class or collective actions in court or arbitration.”).
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FLSA] does not . . . prohibit individualized arbitration proceedings” of
workplace disputes.145 Finally, the majority noted that “Congress adopted
the Arbitration Act in 1925 in response to a perception that courts were
unduly hostile to arbitration,”146 and that Congress thereby “require[d]
courts ‘rigorously’ to ‘enforce arbitration agreements according to their
terms, including . . . the rules under which that arbitration will be con-
ducted.’”147 In an argument that might compel when applied to parties
exercising equal bargaining power, the majority concluded that “[t]he
parties before us contracted for arbitration. They proceeded to specify
the rules that would govern their arbitrations, indicating their intention to
use individualized rather than class or collective action[s]” and that the
Federal Arbitration Act requires that their contractually expressed intent
be enforced.148
While the majority conceded that “the dissent [wa]s no doubt right that
class actions can enhance enforcement by ‘spread[ing] the costs of litiga-
tion’”149 and acknowledged that policy arguments about arbitration pro-
visions and class action waivers are “debatable,”150 it concluded that the
“law is clear” that these provisions are enforceable.151 Indeed, it ruled
that the enforceability of mandatory arbitration provisions cannot be con-
ditioned “on the availability of class-wide arbitration procedures.”152
Thus, the majority upheld the mandatory arbitration provisions in the
three consolidated cases before it, thereby reversing the contrary rulings
in the Seventh and Ninth Circuits.153 Epic Systems gives employers better
reason than ever to be confident that the mandatory arbitration provi-
sions, class action waivers, and nondisclosure clauses they impose on their
employees will be enforced.
The four-Justice dissent in Epic Systems identified many of the harms
that mandatory individual arbitration provisions impose on workers.154
For example, the dissent stated that individual wage and hour “claims are
small, scarcely of a size warranting the expense of seeking redress alone”
and that employees could “gain effective redress for wage underpayment
commonly experienced” only “by joining together with others similarly
circumstanced.”155 The dissent contextualized these harms as part of a
145. Id. at 1626 (citing Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 32
(1991)); see also id. (“In fact, it turns out that ‘[e]very circuit to consider the question’ has
held that the FLSA allows agreements for individualized arbitration.” (alteration in origi-
nal) (quoting NLRB v. Alt. Ent., Inc., 858 F.3d 393, 413 (6th Cir. 2017) (Sutton, J., concur-
ring in part and dissenting in part)).
146. Id. at 1621.
147. Id. (quoting Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 570 U.S. 228, 233 (2013)).
148. Id.




152. Id. at 1631 (quoting AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 336 (2011)).
153. Id. at 1632.
154. See id. at 1633–49 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
155. Id. at 1633.
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broader “labor market imbalance” in which “[t]o block such concerted
action, their employers require[ ] them to sign, as a condition of employ-
ment, arbitration agreements banning collective judicial and arbitral pro-
ceedings of any kind.”156
Similarly, the dissent asserted, existing labor laws recognize that em-
ployment terms are the products of unequal bargaining power and thus
these laws aim to protect employees from enforcement of employment
terms that would impede their collective action.157 The dissent reasoned
that the NLRA and its predecessor, the Norris–LaGuardia Act, recognize
“that employees must have the capacity to act collectively in order to
match their employers’ clout in setting terms and conditions of employ-
ment.”158 These laws and the court decisions enforcing them do not view
employment contract terms as the product of mutual intent; rather, they
recognize that “workers often had to accept employment on whatever
terms employers dictated.”159 Thus, labor laws, including § 7 of the
NLRA, “guarantee[ ] employees ‘the right . . . to engage in other con-
certed activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual
aid or protection.’”160 The dissent would have found that “[s]uits to en-
force workplace rights collectively fit comfortably under the umbrella
‘concerted activities for the purpose of . . . mutual aid or protection.’”161
Further, while acknowledging that the Federal Arbitration Act pro-
motes enforcement of arbitration agreements, the dissent argued that the
Act’s legislative history “evidence[s] Congress’ aim to enable merchants
of roughly equal bargaining power to enter into binding agreements to
arbitrate commercial disputes” and “shows that Congress did not intend
the statute to apply to arbitration provisions in employment contracts.”162
Thus, the dissent would have refused to enforce employment terms in
derogation of that right, including mandatory arbitration provisions, class
action waivers, and nondisclosure provisions.163
The dissent took issue with the majority’s presentation of mandatory
arbitration provisions as a freedom of contract matter.164 Given the
power imbalance, the “freedom to depart” from default dispute resolu-
tion processes “is entirely one sided.”165 The dissent lamented that
[o]nce again, the Court ignores the reality that sparked the NLRA’s
passage: Forced to face their employers without company, employees
ordinarily are no match for the enterprise that hires them. Employ-
ees gain strength, however, if they can deal with their employers in
numbers. That is the very reason why the NLRA secures against em-
156. Id.
157. Id. at 1637–38.
158. Id. at 1634.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 1635 (emphasis omitted) (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 157).
161. Id. at 1637 (alteration in original) (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 157).
162. Id. at 1642–43.
163. See id. at 1648–49.
164. Id. at 1640.
165. Id.
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ployer interference employees’ right to act in concert for their “mu-
tual aid or protection.”166
The dissent urged Congress to correct “the Court’s elevation of the [Fed-
eral Arbitration Act] over workers’ rights to act in concert.”167 Unfortu-
nately, it is unlikely that Congress will act.168
This author agrees with the dissent and would have found that the col-
lective action protected by existing labor law includes class action litiga-
tion. However, this Article does not take up the labor law or statutory
interpretation conclusions in the Epic Systems consolidated cases. This
Article details these cases because they show how coercive employment
dispute resolution terms are imposed, how they privilege employers over
employees, how they are in tension with policy goals of existing labor law,
and how their enforceability is scaffolded by recent Supreme Court inter-
pretations of the Federal Arbitration Act.
Thus, taking the labor law defeat as given169—at least temporarily—
this Article aims to expose the previously ignored tax consequences that
should apply to employers who impose coercive employment dispute res-
olution terms on their workforces. It proposes a new check on mandatory
arbitration, class action waiver, and nondisclosure of dispute provisions
by arguing that when employers impose these terms on their workforces,
they obtain a new and valuable intangible asset that should be subject to
tax.
IV. CURRENT TAX TREATMENT OF COERCIVE
EMPLOYMENT DISPUTE RESOLUTION TERMS
The current tax treatment of a coercive employment term depends on
the context in which it is acquired. It turns on whether the coercive em-
ployment term is already in effect and acquired from a business seller as
part of a business purchase or is newly imposed on an employee.
166. Id. (quoting 29 U.S.C. §§ 151, 157, 158).
167. Id. at 1633.
168. See, e.g., STONE & COLVIN, supra note 21, at 25 (“The Arbitration Fairness Act has
been repeatedly introduced in Congress . . . . However, it has not received a vote, and
passage in the current Congress appears unlikely.”); Stone, supra note 115 (“In 2009, Rep.
Hank Johnson of Georgia proposed the Arbitration Fairness Act which would ban
mandatory pre-dispute arbitration for employment, consumer, franchise, and civil-rights
claims, preserving access to the courts. But the bill didn’t get the attention it deserved,
even among Democrats, and now with a Republican majority, reform is virtually dead for
the foreseeable future.”).
169. Interestingly, however, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals declined to extend the
holding in Epic Systems in a recent case outside of the employment context. See Henry v.
Educ. Fin. Serv. (In re Henry), 944 F.3d 587, 590 (5th Cir. 2019) (per curiam) (“The bank-
ruptcy court reasoned that Henry’s claims did not ‘arise under the loan agreement between
the parties,’ because Wells Fargo’s ‘obligation to comply with the Court’s discharge order
and the statutory injunction provided under 11 U.S.C. § 524 is not, and cannot be, part of a
contractual negotiation between private parties.’ The bankruptcy court found Epic Systems
to be ‘inapplicable to the instant case,’ because ‘Henry’s claims do not arise out of an
arbitrable contract between the parties,’ and because ‘the Supreme Court gave no indica-
tion in Epic that it intended its decision to reach’ the Bankruptcy Code.” (footnote
omitted)).
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Although the former context is not the primary focus of this Article, it
is useful to consider how tax law treats existing coercive employment dis-
pute resolution terms when they are acquired from a business seller be-
cause these rules contrast with how tax law currently treats the imposition
of a coercive employment term by an employer on its own employees.
This contrast reveals an unreasonable disparity: while tax law recognizes
coercive employment dispute resolution terms as intangible assets with
value to the employer in the business purchase context, it ignores these
same intangible assets—and the value they provide to employers—in the
business operations context when an employer newly imposes them on its
workforce.170 This inconsistency is unjustified and should be resolved by
taxing employers on the value that they receive when they impose coer-
cive employment dispute resolution terms on their employees.
When coercive employment dispute resolution terms are acquired as
part of a business purchase—such as when a buyer acquires a workforce
with contractual mandatory arbitration provisions, class action waiver
provisions, or nondisclosure provisions—the value of these contractual
terms is recognized and the buyer amortizes that value171 over the fifteen
years following the business purchase.172
When a taxpayer buys a business with coercive employment terms in
place, tax law recognizes those terms as intangible assets that enrich the
new employer.173 In contrast, when a taxpayer imposes coercive employ-
ment terms on one or more of its employees, tax law fails to recognize
those terms as intangible assets that enrich the existing employer. This
Article argues that it should. By ignoring the value that an employer cap-
tures by imposing coercive employment dispute resolution terms, tax law
violates its foundational principles and perversely subsidizes the imposi-
tion of these terms.
170. See 26 U.S.C. § 197(c)(2), (d)(1)(C)(i).
171. See PHILIP F. POSTLEWAITE, DAVID L. CAMERON & THOMAS KITTLE-KAMP, FED-
ERAL INCOME TAXATION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTIES AND INTANGIBLE ASSETS ¶ 11.01
(2019) (“The valuation of workforce in place depends on the level of experience, educa-
tion, and training of the personnel of the business, and the terms and conditions of their
employment.” (emphasis added)). Favorable employment terms cause a higher value on
workforce in place, which, like other § 197 intangibles, is amortized over the fifteen years
following the acquisition of the business. See id. Because the amortization period for all
§ 197 intangibles is fifteen years, the aggregate value of all § 197 intangibles is amortized
over fifteen years and there is no need to establish separate values for coercive employ-
ment terms and other § 197 intangibles. See id. However, before § 197 was enacted, courts
valued workforce in place and other aspects of going concern value in a variety of ways,
including by characterizing the excess of the total purchase price for the business over the
business’s tangible assets as going concern value or by capitalizing the excess of expected
earnings from the business in excess of expected earnings attributable to its tangible assets
as going concern value. See id. (describing these valuation methods and noting an example
where the Tax Court established going concern value as approximately 10% of the total
purchase price for the business).
172. See id.; 26 U.S.C. § 197(a), (d)(1)(C)(i).
173. 26 U.S.C. § 197(a), (d)(1)(C)(i).
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V. COERCIVE EMPLOYMENT DISPUTE RESOLUTION
TERMS ARE INCOME TO EMPLOYERS AND
SHOULD BE TAXED
An employer who imposes a coercive employment dispute resolution
term satisfies tax law’s broad definition of gross income. The employer
experiences an accession to wealth, causes a realization event at the im-
position of the term, exercises control, and does not qualify for any recog-
nized exception to gross income.174 Thus, the employer should be taxed.
While taxing employer-imposed mandatory arbitration and other coer-
cive employment dispute resolution terms is an incomplete solution that
should be combined with efforts like the People’s Parity Project and legis-
lative efforts to ban employer-imposed mandatory arbitration, class ac-
tion waiver, and nondisclosure provisions, taxing these terms is an
incomplete solution with promise. Requiring employers to pay tax on the
benefit they receive by imposing coercive employment dispute resolution
terms would discourage the increasingly frequent and broad use of these
terms. Additionally, it would raise revenue to fund enforcement of labor
laws, antidiscrimination laws, and workplace accommodation laws.
A. IT IS A TAKING, NOT AN EXCHANGE
In a prior article, Noncompetes as Tax Evasion, I argue that the IRS
should begin enforcing tax law on employers who use employment
noncompete agreements and that by failing to do so, it perversely subsi-
dizes these agreements.175 Here, I argue that the IRS should begin en-
174. See 26 U.S.C. § 61(a) (“[G]ross income means all income from whatever source
derived . . . .”); Comm’r v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 431 (1955).
175. Rebecca N. Morrow, Noncompetes as Tax Evasion, 96 WASH. U. L. REV. 265
(2018) (addressing coercive employment terms that employers—at least by their own ac-
counts—exchange for additional compensation). To the extent that noncompete provisions
or other coercive employment terms (which primarily provide future benefits to the em-
ployer rather than benefits that are expended primarily within the year of payment) are
exchanged for compensation, Noncompetes as Tax Evasion argues that employers should
be prohibited from immediately deducting the employment compensation. Id. at 323. In-
stead, a portion of compensation attributable to the noncompete should be treated as an
expenditure and amortized over the restricted period. Id. Delaying the deduction for com-
pensation paid for a noncompete or other coercive employment term to match it to the
period covered by that term would remove a tax subsidy that currently perversely incen-
tivizes employment noncompetes and would better reflect foundational principles of tax
law. See id. at 316–22. While focusing on a particularly common and particularly harmful
form of restrictive employment covenant—the employment noncompete agreement—the
arguments in Noncompetes as Tax Evasion apply similarly to other vertical restrictive cove-
nants between employers and employees, many of which have been described by labor law
expert Professor Orly Lobel, including provisions prohibiting employees from soliciting
customers or co-workers after the employment relationship ends or penalizing employees
for exiting the employment relationship. See Orly Lobel, Gentlemen Prefer Bonds: How
Employers Fix the Talent Market, 59 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 663, 678 (2020) (“[B]eyond
traditional non-competes, employers also regularly require their employees to sign a wide
and constantly expanding variety of restrictive clauses designed to reduce the outside op-
tions of employees. These include non-solicitation of customers and co-workers, pre-inno-
vation assignment agreements of all future patents, copyright—as well as non-patentable
and non-copyrightable ideas, non-disclosure agreements that reach beyond what is defined
as secret under trade secrecy laws, and exit penalties.”). Regardless of the particular type
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forcing tax law on employers who impose mandatory arbitration, class
action waiver, and nondisclosure of dispute terms and that by failing to
do so, it perversely subsidizes these coercive employment dispute resolu-
tion provisions.176 While the goals of these articles are similar—fidelity to
tax law principles, hope for a freer labor market, desire to stop tax-incen-
tivizing monopsony, and instinct to call attention to unexamined tax in-
centives—the approaches are different.
When an employer imposes a noncompete provision on an employee,
the employer is legally required to provide compensation or other consid-
eration in exchange for the imposition.177 Thus, there is an exchange, and
the proper tax treatment turns on when the employer can deduct what it
pays in the exchange.178 Noncompetes as Tax Evasion argues that the em-
ployer should not be permitted to deduct the compensation it pays for the
noncompete until the period of time in which the employer receives the
benefit of the noncompete.179
By contrast, when an employer imposes a coercive employment dispute
resolution provision on an employee, the employer is not legally required
to provide compensation or other consideration in exchange for the im-
position.180 Employers impose mandatory arbitration provisions, class ac-
tion waivers, and nondisclosure provisions without even claiming to pay
for them; courts enforce these provisions without even inquiring as to
whether they are supported by consideration.181 A mere change in em-
ployer policy can subject a workforce to coercive employment dispute
resolution terms.182 Or, an employer can impose these terms by notifying
its workforce via a mass email.183
of restriction imposed, whenever an employer can be seen as purchasing a lasting restric-
tive covenant through compensation (by which I mean a covenant that will benefit the
employer beyond the tax year in which it is imposed), the employer should not be permit-
ted to immediately deduct that compensation and instead should be required to amortize it
over the period covered by the restrictive covenant. See Morrow, supra, at 323.
176. Furthering the work of Noncompetes as Tax Evasion, this Article addresses coer-
cive employment dispute resolution terms between employers and employees that are not
purchased through additional compensation (coercive employment dispute resolution
terms).
177. Morrow, supra note 175, at 300.
178. Id. at 270–71.
179. Id. at 272. Of course, one might argue that the pretext of bilateral-imposition of
noncompete terms should not control—that employer claims of adequate consideration
are false—and that, therefore, all or many noncompete agreements should be treated as
unilaterally imposed coercive employment terms. This author does not object to that view
and is of the opinion that it would turn on the relative parity or lopsidedness of the bar-
gaining power of the parties to the employment contract. However, Noncompetes as Tax
Evasion argues that employers should not be allowed to claim that vertical restrictive cove-
nants are supported by compensation consideration for purposes of contract law and then
disclaim that they are supported by compensation consideration for purposes of tax law.
Id. at 271.
180. Cf. id. at 300–01.
181. Cf. id.
182. See supra notes 141 and accompanying text.
183. See supra note 117.
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Of course, coercive employment dispute resolution provisions—or at
least mandatory arbitration provisions and nondisclosure of dispute pro-
visions—involve an illusory exchange of benefit. It is not just the em-
ployee who is prevented from litigating; the employer is also prevented
from litigating employment-related disputes. However, the data on arbi-
tration of employment disputes exposes just how illusory this exchange
is.184 Mandatory arbitration provisions help employers by harming em-
ployees.185 They prevent employees from bringing claims,186 make it less
likely that employees will win employment-related disputes,187 and de-
press damages.188 Mandatory arbitration provisions and nondisclosure of
dispute provisions are stunningly effective at shielding employers from
liability for violating wage and hour laws, antidiscrimination laws, sexual
harassment laws, and more.189 The data shows that coercive employment
dispute resolution terms “function as a virtual death knell for most em-
ployment claims, including the many individual wrongful dismissal or har-
assment claims” and wage and hour claims.190
Furthermore, class action waivers do not involve even an illusory claim
of mutual benefit. While it is common for many employees to share an
employment-related legal claim against a single employer—for wage and
hour violations or hostile work environment, for example—it is difficult
to think of circumstances in which many employers would share an em-
ployment-related legal claim against a single employee. Class action waiv-
ers foreclose opportunities that are valuable to employees and irrelevant
to employers.
Finally, if employment dispute resolution provisions were about mutual
benefit—if they were primarily seeking to reduce the attorneys’ fees and
time that each party spends to resolve a dispute—then we should see
them executed after a particular dispute has arisen, when each side can
184. See Sternlight, supra note 30, at 171–72; see also Sternlight, supra note 78, at 1312
(“Some arbitration commentators have urged that arbitration can be quicker, cheaper, and
simpler than litigation, thus offering an accessible venue for employees who cannot litigate
their claims in court. Yet available empirical evidence now shows that mandatory employ-
ment arbitration is bringing about the opposite result—eroding rather than boosting em-
ployees’ access to justice by suppressing employees’ ability to file claims. This evidence
reveals that employees who are covered by mandatory arbitration provisions almost never
file arbitration claims. The empirical evidence also provides important insights as to why so
few employees file claims in arbitration: (1) employees win less often and win less money
in arbitration than in litigation; (2) attorneys are less willing to take employee claims that
are headed to arbitration rather than litigation; (3) arbitration is not a hospitable venue for
pro se employees; and (4) arbitration is being used to eradicate the class actions, collective
actions, and even group litigation that are essential to many employees.” (footnotes
omitted)).
185. See supra note 159 and accompanying text; Sternlight, supra note 78, at 1311
(“Employers are using arbitration clauses to make it more difficult for employees to bring
successful individual claims in any forum and also to eliminate the threat of class actions or
even collective or group claims in both litigation and arbitration.” (footnote omitted)).
186. See supra Section II.B.1.
187. See supra Section II.B.2.
188. See supra Section II.B.3.
189. See Sternlight, supra note 78, at 1313–14.
190. Estlund, supra note 23, at 708.
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best assess the relative benefits of litigation as compared to arbitration
and class action as compared to individualized resolution.191 This Article
holds open the possibility that post-dispute arbitration provisions might
constitute mutually beneficial exchanges. However, this is not when we
tend to see employment dispute resolution terms imposed. On the con-
trary, employers in a 2018 survey responded that they impose dispute res-
olution terms before a dispute has arisen, as a condition of employment,
and usually near the time when a new employee is hired.192
Consistent with the data, the American public recognizes that
mandatory arbitration favors the employer at the expense of the em-
ployee. For example, in a 2019 survey of voters, 59% of respondents
agreed that “arbitration requirements mainly benefit corporations,” com-
pared to “just 7% [who indicated that] they mainly benefit . . .
employees.”193
Put plainly, when an employer imposes a coercive dispute resolution
provision, that employer receives a benefit without suffering a loss. It is a
taking, not an exchange. This taking of benefit is made possible through
the employer’s exertion of its superior bargaining power. Thus, proper
tax treatment requires that the employer report the benefit received as
gross income and pay tax on it.
B. WHEN AN EMPLOYER IMPOSES A COERCIVE EMPLOYMENT
DISPUTE RESOLUTION TERM, THAT EMPLOYER REALIZES
INCOME
The thesis of this Article is that coercive employment dispute resolu-
tion terms—including mandatory arbitration provisions, class action
waivers, and nondisclosure provisions—result in gross income to the em-
ployer, on which the employer should be taxed. When an employer im-
poses such a term on its workforce, the employer has an accession to
wealth (it obtains a new intangible asset in the form of the employment
191. See Stuart H. Bompey, Michael Delikat & Lisa K. McClelland, The Attack on Ar-
bitration and Mediation of Employment Disputes, 13 LAB. LAW. 21, 34–35 (1997) (“The
principal advantages to employers of arbitration compared to civil litigation are time and
money. Because of limited discovery and motion practice, as well as the informality of
hearings, arbitration may cost far less than civil litigation.” (footnote omitted)).
192. See supra text accompanying notes 47–48.
193. Memorandum from Guy Molyneux & Geoff Garin, Hart Rsch. Assocs., to Inter-
ested Parties 1 (Feb. 28, 2019), https://web.archive.org/web/20190802030527/https://
www.justice.org/sites/default/files/2.28.19%20Hart%20poll%20memo.pdf [https://
perma.cc/PV3P-BDH8] (report accessible through archived web material). Similarly, polls
of voters indicate that Republicans, Democrats, and Independents would support legisla-
tion to end mandatory arbitration. See Forced Arbitration Hearings, supra note 1, at 4
(statement of Deepak Gupta, Founding Principal, Gupta Wessler PLLC) (“Overwhelming
majorities of Republicans, Democrats, and independents—80% or more of each—support
federal legislation to end forced arbitration.”); CELINDA LAKE, DAVID MERMIN, LIESL
NEWTON & CLAIRE REDEMER, LAKE RSCH. PARTNERS, FINDINGS FROM A NATIONAL SUR-
VEY OF 1,000 LIKELY 2016 VOTERS 37 (2015), https://ourfinancialsecurity.org/wp-content/
uploads/2015/07/Toplines.AFRCRL.public.070715.pdf [https://perma.cc/X7Z4-ADDF]
(polling likely voters in 2016 election and finding that 75% oppose forced arbitration im-
posed on bank customers).
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dispute resolution term it prefers), causes a realization event, and exer-
cises control. Of course, these three elements cause the employer to have
gross income according to Glenshaw Glass.194
1. Tax Law Defines Gross Income Broadly
Tax law provides strong authority to construe gross income broadly.
When Congress defined gross income in § 61 of the Internal Revenue
Code as “all income from whatever source derived,”195 it acted “to exert
. . . ’the full measure of its taxing [authority]’” as granted by the Sixteenth
Amendment to the Constitution.196 Courts have long held that gross in-
come is broadly defined while exclusions from gross income are narrowly
construed.197
An employer who imposes a coercive employment dispute resolution
term has gross income as a result of that imposition, and the IRS should
tax it. The imposition satisfies the three-element definition of gross in-
come in Glenshaw Glass.198 By imposing a coercive employment dispute
resolution term, the employer has an accession to wealth, clearly realized,
and in the taxpayer’s control.199
2. An Employer Who Imposes a Coercive Employment Dispute
Resolution Term Has an Accession to Wealth
An employer enjoys a significant accession to wealth by imposing a
coercive employment dispute resolution term. The employer is enriched
by imposition because these terms make employees far less likely to bring
legal claims against their employer,200 less likely to win,201 and less likely
to win big.202 “[B]y imposing mandatory arbitration on its employees, an
employer can ensure that it will face only a miniscule chance of ever hav-
ing to answer for future legal misconduct against employees.”203 Simi-
larly, by imposing a class action waiver on its employees, an employer can
“curtail most, if not all, employment class actions seeking broad-scale
changes in the U.S. workplace.”204 Finally, by imposing a nondisclosure
provision, an employer can hide its wrongdoing from current and pro-
spective employees and from its customers.205 Coercive employment dis-
194. See Comm’r v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 431 (1955).
195. 26 U.S.C. § 61(a).
196. Glenshaw, 348 U.S. at 429 (quoting Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U.S. 331, 334
(1940)); see U.S. Const. amend. XVI (“The Congress shall have power to lay and collect
taxes on incomes, from whatever source derived, without apportionment among the sev-
eral States, and without regard to any census or enumeration.”).
197. See Glenshaw, 348 U.S. at 429–30.
198. See id. at 431 (“Here we have instances of undeniable accessions to wealth, clearly
realized, and over which the taxpayers have complete dominion.”).
199. See id.
200. See supra Section II.B.1.
201. See supra Section II.B.2.
202. See supra Section II.B.2.
203. Estlund, supra note 23, at 707.
204. Gilles, supra note 117, at 419.
205. See Sternlight, supra note 30, at 181.
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pute resolution terms do not just shield employers from justice; they
predictably and measurably save employers money.
Intangible assets—and even some commercial dealings—that will save
a taxpayer money are gross income. “There are plenty of other situations
where what looks like ‘saving money’ to the taxpayer looks like ‘income’
to the law.”206 For example, exchanges of labor that save a taxpayer from
having to pay for the labor received cause gross income.207 Cancellation
of debt is gross income because it saves a taxpayer from having to repay
the debt.208 A third party’s payment of a legal obligation owed by a tax-
payer is gross income because it saves the taxpayer from having to pay
that legal obligation directly.209 A corporation’s repurchase of its own
bonds for below par value is gross income because it saves the corpora-
tion from having to pay a third-party bondholder at maturity.210 When
“assets previously offset” by anticipated obligations are made available
for other uses, a taxpayer is enriched.211 Coercive employment dispute
resolution terms predictably and measurably save employers money.
They make available for other uses money that employers otherwise
would have paid as damages to their employees.
Similarly, the acquisition of a desired contract right is gross income.
The acquisition of a contract right should be taxed like the acquisition of
property because, as Professor Bryan Camp explains, a contract right is a
form of property.212 “Contracts themselves are a species of property
called a ‘chose in action.’ . . . A chose in action is a species of intangible
personalty that can be owned and transferred.”213 A lease, for example,
which tax law recognizes as a property right,214 is a right born of contract
206. Bryan T. Camp, The Play’s the Thing: A Theory of Taxing Virtual Worlds, 59 HAS-
TINGS L.J. 1, 41 (2007); see, e.g., id. (“For example, performing house-sitting services in
exchange for free rent is also just ‘saving money,’ yet the value of the unpaid rent is un-
questionably gross income.”).
207. See Rev. Rul. 79-24, 1979-1 C.B. 60 (“[T]he fair market value of the . . . services
taken in payment must be included in [gross] income.”).
208. See 26 U.S.C. § 61(a)(11) (listing as an item of gross income “[i]ncome from dis-
charge of indebtedness”).
209. See Old Colony Tr. Co. v. Comm’r, 279 U.S. 716, 729 (1929) (“The discharge by a
third person of an obligation to [a taxpayer] is equivalent to receipt by the person taxed.”).
210. See United States v. Kirby Lumber Co., 284 U.S. 1, 3 (1931).
211. Id.
212. See Camp, supra note 206, at 54–55.
213. Id. at 54. Because Camp finds that contract rights are property, he finds that even
lines of computer code within Second Life and other “massively multiplayer online role-
playing games” and player accounts are property of the player even if the underlying intel-
lectual property remains owned by the game developer. See id. at 55–61.
214. See 26 U.S.C. § 178(a) (providing that the value of a lease is amortizable over the
lease term including renewal options). Similarly, certain contracts with customers, poten-
tial business competitors, and suppliers are § 197 intangibles when acquired in connection
with business acquisitions. Id. § 197(d)(1)(C)(iv) (listing as a 197 intangible “any customer-
based intangible”); id. § 197(d)(2)(A)(iii) (defining customer-based intangible as including
“any other value resulting from future provision of goods or services pursuant to relation-
ships (contractual or otherwise) in the ordinary course of business with customers”); id.
§ 197(d)(1)(C)(v) (listing as a § 197 intangible “any supplier-based intangible”); id.
§ 197(d)(3) (defining supplier-based intangible as including “any value resulting from fu-
ture acquisitions of goods or services pursuant to relationships (contractual or otherwise)
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that gives the lessee the right to use the property for the lease term. Tax
law recognizes this contract right as a valuable intangible asset.
When an employer imposes its desired employment dispute resolution
term, it acquires a new mechanism to obtain dismissal of lawsuits brought
by employees, prevent employees from bringing claims collectively, hide
its misconduct from other employees and the public, and recover against
an employee who discloses its unlawful activity in violation of a nondis-
closure provision. These contract rights are valuable in that they signifi-
cantly reduce employers’ dispute resolution costs, the damages that
employers would otherwise have paid to employees, and the costs of re-
medial measures that employers would otherwise have taken in order to
avoid future lawsuits. Thus, tax law should recognize the contract rights
that employers obtain by imposing coercive employment dispute resolu-
tion terms as valuable intangible assets, the acquisition of which is subject
to tax.
Scholars equate coercive employment dispute resolution terms with
free insurance policies,215 ex ante exculpatory clauses,216 and get-out-of-
jail-free cards for employers.217 They describe these terms as wealth
transfers from employees to employers218 and erasures of employee
rights.219 Each analogy shows why employers should be taxed when they
impose coercive employment dispute resolution terms.
No one would doubt that a taxpayer who received free insurance cov-
erage or a get-out-of-jail-free card (if such a card existed) had realized
gross income upon that receipt. Nor should we doubt that an employer
who receives the benefit of unilaterally imposing its preferred dispute res-
olution term on its workforce realizes gross income upon that imposition.
Indeed, employers acknowledge that these terms are valuable to them in
other contexts,220 and tax law recognizes that favorable employment con-
in the ordinary course of business with suppliers of goods or services to be used or sold by
the taxpayer”); id. § 197(d)(1)(E) (listing as a § 197 intangible “any covenant not to com-
pete (or other arrangement to the extent such arrangement has substantially the same ef-
fect as a covenant not to compete) entered into in connection with an acquisition (directly
or indirectly) of an interest in a trade or business or substantial portion thereof”).
215. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
216. See supra text accompanying note 76.
217. STONE & COLVIN, supra note 21, at 26.
218. See infra note 313 and accompanying text.
219. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
220. Chandrasekher & Horton, supra note 36, at 16 (noting that some companies find
mandatory arbitration so valuable that, even when they unilaterally impose arbitration,
they include in their mandatory arbitration provisions “rewards for plaintiffs to arbitrate
those claims on an individual basis” and that “AT&T, Sallie Mae, and Verizon promised to
pay a bounty of between $5,000 and $10,000 and up to double attorneys’ fees to any con-
sumer who won an award that exceeded the company’s settlement offer” in an effort to
increase the chances that a court would uphold their mandatory arbitration provision);
Gilles, supra note 36, at 853–59 (describing various “[b]ounties, [p]remium [p]ayments, and
‘[b]ump-[u]ps’” that many companies including Clearwire, T-Mobile, Sallie Mae, Netflix,
Verizon, Microsoft, and Sovereign Bank proffer to pay customers in the forced arbitration
provisions they impose on their customers).
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tract terms are intangible assets in the context of business purchases.221 A
coercive employment dispute resolution term is a valuable intangible as-
set to the employer who imposes it.
Finally, employers know that they experience an accession to wealth by
imposing coercive employment dispute resolution terms. That is why they
impose them. It is why they include them in employment handbooks, con-
tracts of adhesion, and offer letters. It is why they email their existing
employees, requiring them to consent to the terms as a condition of con-
tinued employment. It is why employers hire lawyers to draft these terms
and to enforce them against workers who attempt to litigate—indepen-
dently or through class action suits—workplace disputes. Employers are
not ignorant of the value they receive by imposing these terms. To the
contrary, “larger organizations with more sophisticated human resource
policies and better legal counsel are more likely to adopt policies like
mandatory arbitration that protect them against legal liability.”222 Em-
ployers demonstrate the value that they place on coercive employment
dispute resolution terms through their actions, and tax law should—at
long last—recognize that value and tax it.
3. Imposition of a Coercive Employment Dispute Resolution Term is a
Realization Event
The second element of gross income—realization—deserves the most
attention. Often, a realization event is a sale or exchange.223 The imposi-
tion of a coercive employment dispute resolution term is not a sale, and
when one considers the realities of how these terms are implemented and
how they function, their imposition is not an exchange.224 Still, however,
case law supports the conclusion that the imposition of a coercive em-
ployment dispute resolution term is a realization event.
Fundamentally, an employer’s imposition of a coercive employment
dispute resolution term is a realization event because it results in the em-
ployer acquiring a new intangible asset that the employer did not have
before. The receipt of a new asset is what distinguishes it from unrealized
appreciation in a previously owned asset. Furthermore, while we are ac-
customed to thinking that new assets are acquired by purchase, by ex-
change, as compensation for labor, or as a return on investment, tax law
provides many examples of when new assets are received by a taxpayer in
exchange for nothing. When a taxpayer acquires something for nothing, it
221. See 26 U.S.C. § 197(d)(1)(C)(i) (intangibles include “workforce in place including
its composition and terms and conditions (contractual or otherwise) of its employment”);
Treas. Reg. § 1.197-2(b)(3) (intangibles include “the terms and conditions of employment
whether contractual or otherwise”); supra note 170 and accompanying text.
222. COLVIN, supra note 27, at 6 (emphasis added). Larger employers “could also be-
come trendsetters over time if smaller employers copy these practices that larger employ-
ers have proven to be effective in protecting employers against legal actions.” Id.
223. See Helvering v. Bruun, 309 U.S. 461, 469 (1940).
224. See supra Section V.A.
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is a realization event. Several of these examples involve a taxpayer who is
able to acquire something for nothing by virtue of that taxpayer’s status.
Take, for example, a taxpayer in Glenshaw Glass.225 That taxpayer re-
ceived compensatory damages and reported them as income.226 However,
in addition, that taxpayer received treble damages.227 While the goal of
the treble damages was to punish the offender (not to reward the tax-
payer), it was the taxpayer who received the treble damages by virtue of
the taxpayer’s legal status as the prevailing plaintiff.228 As is also true of
punitive damages, which are paid to a prevailing plaintiff by virtue of its
role as prevailing plaintiff, treble damages are not in exchange for prop-
erty or in return for labor.229 Rather, they are akin to a windfall received
by the prevailing plaintiff by virtue of its status as such.230 Although these
receipts are available to a taxpayer by virtue of the taxpayer’s status as
prevailing plaintiff, they are taxable as gross income.231 They enrich the
taxpayer, are realized when obtained, and are within the taxpayer’s
control.232
Similarly, coercive employment dispute resolution terms are not re-
ceived by employers following an exchange of value, nor are they a re-
ward for labor or investment. Rather, they are available to an employer
by virtue of its status as an employer—and by virtue of its superior bar-
gaining power. These terms enrich the employer, are realized when the
employer imposes them, and are within the employer’s control.
Even if a reader is unconvinced that an employer’s imposition of a co-
ercive employment dispute resolution term is a taking, and instead sees it
as an exchange, the value of the benefits that the employer receives
should still be taxed to the employer. Such a position would require only
that a worker also be taxed on the value of the benefits that the worker
receives by virtue of the exchange. Because this author believes that
workers lose value—instead of receiving it— through the imposition of
coercive employment dispute resolution terms, this Article does not pro-
pose that the imposition of these terms should be treated as an exchange.
When a taxpayer acquires something for nothing, it is a realization
event. Glenshaw Glass is not the only example of this principle. Take, for
example, the landowner in Helvering v. Bruun,233 or the finder of cash in
Cesarini v. United States,234 or the embezzler in James v. United States.235
In each of these cases, the realization event was not a sale, exchange,
225. Comm’r v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 429 (1955).
226. Id. at 428.
227. Id.
228. Id. at 431.
229. See id. at 429.
230. See id.
231. Id. at 431.
232. Id.
233. 309 U.S. 461 (1940).
234. 296 F. Supp. 3 (N.D. Ohio 1969).
235. 366 U.S. 213 (1961).
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receipt of compensation for labor, or return on investment.236 Rather, in
each, the court found a realization event because a taxpayer received
something for nothing.237 The receipt of something new is the touchstone
of a realization event, whether that something new is tangible or intangi-
ble, born of contract law or transferred by deed, earned or received by
virtue of legal status,238 lucked into,239 taken from another, or outright
stolen.240 If coercive employment terms are—as this author argues, and
as tax law recognizes in the context of business purchases—intangible as-
sets that enrich the employer, then a realization event occurs when they
are first obtained by the employer, which is to say when they are first
imposed by the employer on an employee.
The unanimous Supreme Court decision in Helvering v. Bruun,241
which was overruled by statute on its specific facts242 but remains rele-
vant for its treatment of realization of gross income, demonstrates why
the imposition of a coercive employment dispute resolution term is a real-
ization event for the employer. In that case, the taxpayer, Bruun, was a
landlord who owned a parcel of land on which a building stood.243 Bruun
leased the property to a tenant for a term of ninety-nine years.244 Since
the tenant anticipated making use of the property for a long duration, it
apparently made economic sense for the tenant to demolish the existing
building and construct a new and more valuable one.245 The tenant did
so.246 The terms of the lease provided that “[t]he lessee was to surrender
the land, upon termination of the lease, with all buildings and improve-
ments thereon.”247 Unfortunately for the tenant, termination of the lease
and surrender of the new, improved property came early.248 The tenant
had failed to pay rent, so Bruun terminated the lease and took possession
of the new, improved property.249 While Bruun treated the restoration of
his possession of the property as irrelevant for tax purposes, the U.S. Su-
preme Court agreed with the IRS that Bruun had realized gross income
equal to the fair market value of the tenant improvements when the lease
terminated.250
236. See James, 366 U.S. at 221; Bruun, 309 U.S. at 469; Cesarini, 296 F. Supp. at 8.
237. See James, 366 U.S. at 221; Bruun, 309 U.S. at 469; Cesarini, 296 F. Supp. at 8.
238. See Bruun, 309 U.S. at 469.
239. See Cesarini, 296 F. Supp. at 8.
240. See James, 366 U.S. at 221.
241. See Bruun, 309 U.S. at 469 (holding tenant’s improvement to land was taxable gain
to the lessor).
242. See 26 U.S.C. § 109 (excluding the value of tenant improvements from the land-
lord’s gross income); 26 U.S.C. § 1019 (providing that the value of tenant improvements is
not added to the landlord’s basis in her property and thereby reflecting no increase to basis
since no tax cost was imposed).







250. Id. at 467, 469.
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Several things are notable about the Bruun holding. First, the landlord
did not acquire income by virtue of his labor or capital investment.251
Rather, he received something of a windfall, one that was available to
him solely because of his legal status—that of landlord.252
Second, the landlord in some sense retook possession of a property
that he owned all along.253 At all times, the landlord owned the property,
and for a period of time, it was merely leased to another.254 However, a
realization event was found because the value increase to that property
was not the result of passive market appreciation (thus, not unrealized
appreciation) or of his own labor (thus, not imputed income).255 The
value increase depended on the taxpayer taking something from another
(the tenant) that he was lawfully allowed to take by virtue of his status as
the landlord.256
Finally, the IRS and the U.S. Supreme Court both found that the land-
lord was required to report the increase in value as gross income in the
year the lease terminated, even though doing so would require an ap-
praisal to establish value (meaning that the rule likely would cause valua-
tion disputes) and even though the taxpayer had not severed any value
from or “cashed out” any portion of the asset (meaning that the rule
might impose tax liabilities on taxpayers without liquid assets to pay
them).257 The Supreme Court expressly noted that “[i]t is not necessary
to recognition of taxable gain that [a taxpayer] should be able to sever the
improvement begetting the gain from his original capital.”258 Rather,
analogizing Bruun’s receipt of a new, valuable asset from another (nota-
bly, from another to whom Bruun provided nothing in return) to an ex-
change of property, the Court held that realization and recognition of
income resulted from the taxpayer’s receipt of something new and
valuable.259
Bruun found that the landlord realized income upon retaking posses-
sion of improved property because tax law defines gross income broadly,
particularly in commercial contexts where a taxpayer acquires something
new from another.260 In Bruun’s case, the something new—the tenant
improvement—was acquired by the taxpayer not via a fair, adequate ex-
change but via a windfall available to the taxpayer by virtue of his legal
251. See id. at 462, 469.
252. See id. at 469.
253. Id. at 462.
254. Id.
255. See id. at 469.
256. See id. at 462, 469.
257. See id. at 469 (noting that the accession to wealth was not severed or cashed out
from the taxpayer’s investment in the property, the Court held that “[i]t is not necessary to
recognition of taxable gain that he should be able to sever the improvement begetting the
gain from his original capital” because “[i]f that were necessary, no income could arise




260. Id. at 468–69.
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status as a landlord.261 The tenant’s loss was the landlord’s gain, and this
gain was acquired without consideration paid by the landlord.262 Bruun is
an example that in the commercial context, receiving something for noth-
ing is taxable.263
When employers impose coercive employment dispute resolution
terms on their employees, they receive something new—an intangible as-
set born of contract law that bars their employees from bringing employ-
ment-related suits in the venues and with the procedures that our public
system of civil litigation has established. They often prevent employees
from engaging in collective or class-action-style dispute resolution that
might otherwise facilitate resolution of smaller dollar claims, protect em-
ployees from fear or reality of retribution, or enable employees to estab-
lish patterns of unlawful behavior by the employer.264 Each of these
intangible assets is valuable to employers, and each is obtained at the
expense of employees.
Most importantly—as in Bruun—when an employer subjects its
workforce to a coercive employment dispute resolution term, the result-
ing accession to the employer’s wealth, the new value captured, is not the
result of passive market forces and not the result of the employer’s own
labor.265 Nor is the new value obtained by a purchase or other fair, ade-
quate exchange. Rather, it is something like a windfall (value that was not
earned), or like a theft (value that should belong to another), or some-
thing that falls on the spectrum between a windfall and a theft. And it is
available to the employer only by virtue of the employer’s legal status as
an employer.266 Even if it is viewed as an exchange made possible by the
employer’s superior bargaining position, it is properly subject to tax. Par-
ties to an exchange are taxed on the fair market value of what they re-
ceive in the exchange.
Employers impose coercive employment dispute resolution terms uni-
laterally because they can. Their status and superior bargaining position
enable them to take something valuable from their employees and to ap-
propriate that value as their own. When employers impose coercive em-
ployment dispute resolution terms, they convert their superior bargaining
position into new and legally enforceable rights. Labor law has not yet
prevented this. However, tax law should recognize the new, valuable in-
tangible benefit captured by the employer and should tax it.
Bruun does not stand alone in its finding that a taxpayer who receives
something for nothing has gross income. The tax treatment of found
261. See id. at 462.
262. See id.
263. See id. at 469.
264. See supra Sections II.B, II.C.
265. See Bruun, 309 U.S. at 462.
266. In the analogous context of mandatory individual arbitration provisions in con-
sumer contracts, Justice Kagan described the quasi-taking of imposing coercive terms by
explaining that “[t]he monopolist gets to use its monopoly power to insist on a contract
effectively depriving its victims of all legal recourse.” Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors
Rest., 570 U.S. 228, 240 (2013) (Kagan, J., dissenting).
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property and stolen property supports the conclusion that a taxpayer who
receives something for nothing realizes gross income.267 In Cesarini v.
United States, the court held that when a taxpayer discovers found prop-
erty and reduces it to his undisputed possession, that taxpayer realizes
gross income equal to the fair market value that the taxpayer receives.268
Found property is not acquired as compensation for labor, as investment
returns, or by exchange; rather, it comes into the possession of the owner
without being earned. Nonetheless, realization occurs at the moment of
the find because the taxpayer acquires “current enjoyment rights” in a
new asset.269 Although a possible alternative rule might have found reali-
zation at the moment that lost or abandoned property came into the tax-
payer’s possession,270 the Cesarini court found realization at the moment
the taxpayer discovered found property.271 Thus, the court avoided the
risk that the statute of limitations for inclusion in gross income might
have passed before the taxpayer knew to include the income.272 By set-
ting the realization moment at the taxpayer’s discovery of the asset, the
court minimized the risk that an accession to wealth might escape taxa-
tion entirely.273
Like tenant improvements acquired by a landlord upon termination of
a lease or the finding of property, the taking or embezzlement of property
from another is a realization event. In James v. United States, the Court
held that when a taxpayer embezzles money, he realizes gross income
equal to the amount embezzled.274 In some sense, the Court recognized
the embezzler does not have an unclouded accession to wealth because
267. See Cesarini v. United States, F. Supp. 3, 5 (N.D. Ohio 1969).
268. Id.
269. Joseph M. Dodge, Accessions to Wealth, Realization of Gross Income, and Domin-
ion and Control: Applying the “Claim of Right Doctrine” to Found Objects, Including Re-
cord-Setting Baseballs, 4 FLA. TAX REV. 685, 688 (2000). Dodge explains:
The realization-of-income area is an obscure and perhaps somewhat messy
backwater of income tax doctrine, but it has potential application to windfall
found objects due to the fact that the “finder” rarely obtains instant title. I
argue that courts should restrict the “realization of income” doctrine to cases
where current enjoyment rights (as opposed to “legal title”) in property re-
ceived in-kind are significantly “contingent.” Lack of dominion and control
translates into “nonrealization.”
Id. (emphasis omitted).
270. In Cesarini, this might have been found when the taxpayer took possession of the
piano that contained old currency, which the taxpayer would later find. See Cesarini, 296 F.
Supp. at 7–8.
271. Id. at 8.
272. Id.
273. See id. Indeed, Cesarini shows how strongly courts are guided by practical consid-
erations in determining when income is recognized. The Cesarini court rejected the tax-
payer’s contention that the found property was realized when the taxpayer took possession
of the piano that contained old currency, which the taxpayer would later find, and instead
ruled that it was realized upon the taxpayer’s discovery of it. Id. Tagging realization to
discovery was likely motivated by practical considerations. The court likely worried that
the taxpayer’s preferred rule would allow accessions to wealth to escape taxation by ena-
bling owners to argue that the statute of limitations for taxing the find had passed even
before the find was discovered.
274. James v. United States, 366 U.S. 213, 218 (1961).
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he is always legally obligated to repay his victim.275 However, practical
considerations caused the Court to conclude that embezzled funds should
be treated as recognized income.276 In James, the practical considerations
were that, for embezzlers, the obligation of repayment is illusory.277 Since
embezzlers have no intent to return the property to its lawful owner, the
income must be recognized, lest the property escape taxation in the hands
of the embezzler altogether.278
Whether a reader believes that a coercive employment dispute resolu-
tion term causes an employer to acquire value that is rightfully obtained
(like found property is) or wrongfully obtained (like embezzled property
is), the employer realizes income at the time the employer imposes the
term. The employer obtains a new intangible asset by imposing the term,
and if that value is not taxed at the time the term is imposed, then the
employer’s accession to wealth will escape taxation entirely. Courts con-
sistently demonstrate that practical concerns—and primarily the concern
that an accession to wealth might escape taxation entirely if not taxed at
the right moment—justify the finding that a realization event has
occurred.
4. Even Scholars Who Favor a Narrow Definition of Gross Income
Describe Acquiring an Intangible Asset as a Realization
Event
Some tax scholars favor a narrower definition of gross income, includ-
ing with respect to found property. Professors Lawrence Zelenak and
Martin McMahon argue that although Treasury Regulation § 1.61-14
causes a taxpayer to realize income upon reducing a find to her undis-
puted possession, that regulation has rarely been applied, and never to a
noncash find.279 Indeed, they argue that the regulation is wrong and
should be changed to tax noncash finds only upon disposition.280
In arguing that found property should not be taxed upon the find,
Professors Zelenak and McMahon advance what they identify as a con-
trarian approach to defining gross income.281 They do not define gross
275. Id. at 219.
276. See id. at 219–20.
277. See id.
278. Id. at 221.
279. Lawrence A. Zelenak & Martin J. McMahon, Jr., Taxing Baseballs and Other
Found Property, 84 TAX NOTES 1299, 1301 (1999) (“[T]wo cases—one involving cash, and
the other a brief aside on a hypothetical—constitute the entire judicial career of the trea-
sure trove regulation. No court has ever relied on the regulation to include in gross income
any non-cash found property. Nor has the treasure trove regulation received much atten-
tion in the rulings of the Internal Revenue Service.”); see Treas. Reg. § 1.61-14(a) (as
amended in 1993) (“Treasure trove, to the extent of its value in United States currency,
constitutes gross income for the taxable year in which it is reduced to undisputed
possession.”).
280. Zelenak & McMahon, supra note 279, at 1300–01.
281. Id. at 1306. They are not alone in arguing that gross income should be defined
more narrowly for reasons of administrability and ease of enforcement; they cite Edward
A. Zelinsky’s “powerful case for thinking of the definition of gross income as working
outward from cash, rather than inward from Haig-Simons income.” Id. at 1304 n.52 (quot-
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income using the “usual approach among tax theorists” by “start[ing]
from the sweeping Haig-Simons definition of income as including all con-
sumption and all increase[s] in asset values during a taxable period, and
then . . . describ[ing] the ways in which section 61 retreats from that defi-
nition.”282 Instead, building on the work of Edward Zelinsky, they
grab the other end of the stick, and start with the observation that
basically what the income tax is about is the inclusion of the receipt
of cash in gross income, [and it is from this starting point and goal
that law should] then describe the ways in which section 61 extends
beyond cash receipts. The logic here is that a cash-based tax system
has the “attainable virtues” of ease of valuation and of liquidity, and
that the only reason to extend the tax base beyond cash—to ex-
changes of property, to noncash compensation for services, and to
barter generally—is to discourage tax-induced replacements of cash
with in-kind transfers . . . to prevent wholesale tax avoidance . . . .283
This author subscribes to the broader view of gross income that Profes-
sors Zelenak and McMahon describe as the usual approach among tax
theorists. Nonetheless, it is helpful to note that, even as they argue
against including found property in gross income upon the find, Profes-
sors Zelenak and McMahon describe the finding of property as a realiza-
tion event.284 Indeed, in their view, “[s]evering crops from land and then
eating them is certainly dramatic enough to qualify as a realization
event,” and having an animal kept as livestock give birth to “newborn
livestock certainly seem[s] sufficiently severed from [its] source[ ] to be
treated as realized.”285
Perhaps most importantly, Zelenak and McMahon describe “creating
intangible assets out of nothing” as “sufficiently dramatic to constitute
realizations” of income.286 They use the example of self-created patents
and copyrights, explaining that
patent and copyrights are intangible assets, separate and distinct
from the paper or hard drive on which the information is recorded.
They cannot be viewed as unrealized appreciation in a physical asset;
they have the same ex nihilo quality as found property. If found
property must be taxed because the finding is a realization event,
self-created intangible assets must be taxed because the creation is a
ing Edward A. Zelinsky, For Realization: Income Taxation, Sectoral Accretionism, and the
Virtue of Attainable Virtues, 19 CARDOZO L. REV. 861 (1997)).
282. Id. at 1304.
283. Id. at 1304–05 (footnotes omitted) (citing Zelinsky, supra note 281, at 888, 890).
284. See id. at 1301 & n.21 (describing finding “stumbled-over and searched-for trea-
sure trove” as realization events, noting that “searched-for treasure trove” that is found
through one’s searching for one’s own benefit is excludible as imputed income, and arguing
that there is not sufficient basis to impose “a tax difference between stumbled-over and
searched-for treasure trove”).
285. Id. at 1306 & n.63. While these events are realization events, taxpayers who har-
vest crops or receive newborn livestock do not have gross income because crops and live-
stock raised by one’s self for one’s own consumption are imputed income. See id. at 1306.
286. Id.
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realization event.287
Zelenak and McMahon consistently treat “getting something when a mo-
ment before one had nothing” as a realization event.288 With helpful pre-
cision, they state “[t]o use the standard tools of analysis, the key to the
nontaxation of self-created property is imputed income, not unrealized
appreciation.”289
For purposes of this Article, the distinction between doctrinal bases is
helpful, as is the articulation of the rule that “getting something when a
moment before one had nothing” is a realization event.290 Like obtaining
a patent or copyright, an employer’s imposition of a coercive employment
dispute resolution term involves the acquisition of a set of enforceable
legal rights and entitlements that one did not have before.291 Thus, when
an employer imposes a coercive employment dispute resolution term, the
employer causes a realization event.
287. Id. This quote is followed with a statement that despite a realization event, “there
should still be no tax because there has been no transaction.” Id. This author confesses that
she trips over the word transaction. If acquisition of a new asset is sufficient to constitute a
transaction, then acquisition of crops, newborn livestock, and self-created intangibles are
all circumstances in which there has been a transaction, and there is no tax. Thus, it seems
likely that transaction refers to exchange, sale, or other disposition. If this is the case, then
the reason that tax waits until a later exchange, sale, or other disposition is that it is un-
known whether the crop, newborn livestock, or self-created intangible will be consumed by
the person who labored to create it (thus imputed income and not subject to tax) or ex-
changed away or sold (thus subject to tax).
288. Id.
289. Id.; see also id. (“Given the universal understanding that self-created property is
not taxable unless and until it is sold, why would anyone think that the tax treatment of
self-found [property] should be any different?”).
290. Id.
291. The regulations requiring taxpayers to capitalize certain amounts paid to acquire
or create intangibles define the term “separate and distinct intangible asset” as
a property interest of ascertainable and measurable value in money’s worth
that is subject to protection under applicable State, Federal or foreign law
and the possession and control of which is intrinsically capable of being sold,
transferred or pledged (ignoring any restrictions imposed on assignability)
separate and apart from a trade or business.
Treas. Reg. § 1.263(a)-4(b)(3)(i). It is not clear whether a coercive employment term is
capable of being sold, transferred, or pledged separate and apart from a trade or business.
However, this author advocates against a rule that would find gross income only upon a
taxpayer’s acquisition of a separately sellable intangible asset. Such a rule would be incon-
sistent with Glenshaw Glass and the extensive case law calling for gross income to be
broadly construed. Furthermore, even the regulation defining a “separate and distinct in-
tangible asset” provides a parallel rule for certain future benefits that do not meet this
definition. See id. § 1.263(a)-4(b)(2) (“Any published guidance identifying a future benefit
as an intangible for which capitalization is required under paragraph (b)(1)(iv) of this sec-
tion applies only to amounts paid on or after the date of publication of the guidance.”); id.
§ 1.263(a)-4(b)(1)(iii) (requiring capitalization of amounts “paid to create or enhance a
separate and distinct intangible asset”); id. § 1.263(a)-4(b)(1)(iv) (requiring capitalization
of amounts “paid to create or enhance a future benefit identified in published guidance in
the Federal Register or in the Internal Revenue Bulletin (see § 601.601(d)(2)(ii) of this
chapter) as an intangible for which capitalization is required under this section”).
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5. Employers Exercise Control When They Impose Coercive
Employment Dispute Resolution Terms
An employer who imposes a coercive dispute resolution term exercises
control through that imposition.292 Employers write these terms,293 usu-
ally without engaging in any bargaining294 and with largely unchecked
incentives to write them in favor of their own interests.295 As Justice
Ginsburg writes in her dissent in Epic Systems, the “freedom to depart”
from default dispute resolution processes “is entirely one sided.”296 Em-
ployers alone are able to depart from our open, public system of litigation
to instead impose the closed, private dispute resolution processes they
prefer.
By employers’ own reporting, they typically choose to impose coercive
dispute resolution terms either at the beginning of the employment rela-
tionship297 or after an employee has accepted and begun employment.298
Employers require their employees to “acquiesce”—”consent” seems like
the wrong word—to these terms as a condition of employment.299
Employees understand that they do not have a meaningful opportunity
to negotiate or decline.300 Indeed, the law does not even require an em-
ployee’s signature on the coercive dispute resolution term that binds her:
Generally, . . . so-called “agreements” to arbitrate are unilaterally
imposed by employers on employees who likely are not aware the
terms exist, and, in any case, have little choice but to accept the pro-
vision if they want to get or keep their jobs. While the Federal Arbi-
tration Act does require arbitration agreements to be “written,” they
need not be signed, and courts have upheld “agreements” formed in
a variety of ways. Mandatory arbitration “agreements” are often im-
posed in the fine print of employment or related applications, em-
ployee handbooks, envelope stuffers, computer click-throughs, or e-
mails.301
In sum, an employer who imposes a coercive dispute resolution term ex-
ercises control far in excess of the control required to find gross income.
292. This Article does not address cases when employer control is not exercised. For
example, if after a dispute has arisen, an employer and employee agree to arbitration, that
agreement might be viewed as a mutual exercise of control and an exchange of values.
Similarly, this Article does not address a term that is agreed to by a union or prospective
employee with power equivalent to that of the employer. Such terms would likely involve
back-and-forth negotiation and mark ups as opposed to the terms of adhesion that employ-
ers include in employee handbooks and mass emails to their employees.
293. See supra text accompanying note 83.
294. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
295. See supra notes 84–88 and accompanying text.
296. Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1640 (2018) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
297. See supra text accompanying note 47.
298. See supra text accompanying note 48.
299. See supra text accompanying note 42.
300. See supra text accompanying notes 12 and 83.
301. Sternlight, supra note 30, at 171–72 (footnotes omitted); e.g., supra notes 31 and
139 and accompanying text.
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6. No Exclusion from Gross Income Applies
While some increases to wealth—including imputed income,302 unreal-
ized appreciation in asset value,303 and informal pooling of familial or
other noncommercial labor304—are not subject to tax, realized increases
in wealth from commercial activities are subject to tax.305
Some tax scholars add an additional “exception[ ] to what taxpayers
must include as ‘gross income’” beyond the conventional list of imputed
income, unrealized appreciation, and pooled noncommercial labor.306
Professor Bryan Camp describes this exception as “‘priceless’ income for
which there is no ascertainable fair market value.”307 This author worries
about the use of the term priceless, particularly if applied to difficult-to-
value commercial intangibles as opposed to personal intangibles that are
insusceptible to valuation—like health and love. If applied to difficult-to-
value commercial intangibles, the exclusion of items deemed to be price-
less would create tax subsidies for the creation of intangibles that are
neither worthless nor harmless. It would even create incentives for tax-
payers to make intangibles difficult to value.
Coercive employment dispute resolution terms should not be excluded
from an employer’s gross income on the basis that they are priceless for
three main reasons. First, these terms can be reduced to a value that can
be included on an employer’s tax return for the year of imposition, even
302. Douglas A. Kahn, Exclusion from Income of Compensation for Services and Pool-
ing of Labor Occurring in a Noncommercial Setting, 11 FLA. TAX REV. 683, 688 (2011)
(“While there is no statutory provision excluding imputed income from taxation, it is ex-
cluded under the common law.”).
303. Zelenak & McMahon, supra note 279, at 1304. As Zelenak & McMahon explain:
The two most important retreats [from section 61’s broad definition of gross
income] are the failures to tax unrealized appreciation and imputed income.
Congress has never found it necessary to provide explicit statutory authority
for either of these departures from Haig-Simons income. It is clear, neverthe-
less, that gross income includes neither mere increases in value of property,
nor any of the various forms of imputed income—the value of self-performed
services, self-created property, and the use value of one’s own property.
Id. at 1304 (footnote omitted). Further, “[d]espite the absence of a statutory exclusion for
imputed income, the ‘congressional silence on the subject is clearly tantamount to an af-
firmative grant of immunity.’” Id. at 1304 n.50 (quoting BORIS I. BITTKER & MARTIN J.
MCMAHON, JR., FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF INDIVIDUALS ¶ 3.3[1] (2d ed. 1995)).
304. Kahn, supra note 302, at 697 (“The thrust of the income tax system is to tax in-
come earned from commercial activity. There are good reasons not to tax income gener-
ated from noncommercial activities, and generally taxes have not been applied in that
situation even though no specific exception for noncommercial income has ever been ar-
ticulated. As a corollary to the proposed rule excluding income from noncommercial activ-
ity, the combining of the labor of several persons to reach a common noncommercial goal
should be regarded as noncommercial and so should not be taxed as an exchange of
services.”).
305. See 26 U.S.C. § 61 (defining gross income as “all income from whatever source
derived, including . . . [g]ains derived from dealings in property”); Comm’r v. Glenshaw
Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 431 (1955) (holding that an accession to wealth, clearly realized,
and in the taxpayer’s complete dominion is gross income); Helvering v. Bruun, 309 U.S.
461, 469 (1940) (listing exchanges as realization events).
306. Camp, supra note 206, at 25.
307. Id.
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if that value is imperfect or even rough. In Section V.C., this Article will
propose a starting method for valuing these intangible assets.
Second, valuation challenges do not justify ignoring the benefit that
employers obtain by imposing these terms. To ignore their value is to tax-
incentivize their imposition. As Professor Joseph Dodge persuasively ar-
gues, neither ease of valuation nor the likelihood of precise valuation is
an element of gross income.308 Accessions to wealth that are realized and
are in the taxpayer’s control should, under the fundamental principles of
tax law, be included in the recipient’s gross income.309 “Mere nonliquid-
ity, difficulty of valuation, or [even] a possibility of forfeiture should not
be a bar to current realization. . . . Institutionally, immediate realization
should be the judicial norm, barring extreme circumstances, and excep-
tions should be left to Congress.”310 Failure to tax the income that em-
ployers capture by imposing coercive dispute resolution terms on their
workforces encourages employers to impose these terms more frequently
and more broadly. Further, it encourages taxpayers to engage in further
takings from others, provided that whatever they take is difficult to value.
Finally, recognized exclusions from gross income—such as imputed in-
come, unrealized appreciation, and noncommercial pooling of labor—are
recognized because they are viewed as “necessary . . . [to] prevent[ ] gov-
ernment over-reach . . . or . . . intolerable government intrusion into indi-
vidual lives.”311 An employer’s imposition of a coercive employment
dispute resolution term on its workforce is not a private matter.312
Unfortunately, the IRS has not enforced existing tax law consistently.
Instead, the IRS ignores the imposition of coercive employment dispute
resolution terms, a category of commercial activity that increases the
wealth of employers and significantly harms workers.313 An employer
who imposes a coercive employment dispute resolution term has “income
from whatever source derived”314 that is not imputed income, unrealized
appreciation, or noncommercial pooling; thus, foundational principles of
tax law require that it be taxed.
308. See Dodge, supra note 269, at 688.
309. See Glenshaw, 348 U.S. at 431.
310. Dodge, supra note 269, at 688.
311. Camp, supra note 206, at 25.
312. See supra Section II.C (an employer’s imposition of a coercive employment dis-
pute resolution term harms workers generally); supra Section II.D (vulnerably workers
suffer disproportionate harms); supra Section II.E (and these terms harm society generally
and undermine the rule of law).
313. Indeed, in Arbitration as Wealth Transfer Deepak Gupta and Lina Khan en-
courage readers to view forced arbitration as a wealth transfer, arguing that “the rise and
prevalence of forced arbitration clauses should be understood as both an outcome of and a
contributor to economic inequality,” meaning that “the national conversation about eco-
nomic inequality should therefore include the debate over forced arbitration.” Gupta &
Khan, supra note 131, at 502.
314. 26 U.S.C. § 61(a).
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7. Failure to Tax Violates Burden of Proof Rules
Courts consistently hold that gross income is broadly construed, exclu-
sions are narrowly construed, and the party seeking to exclude has the
burden of proof.315 If tax law’s burden of proof rules were properly ap-
plied to coercive employment dispute resolution terms, then these terms
would be taxed unless the employer who imposed them met its burden to
establish a basis for exclusion.
C. COERCIVE EMPLOYMENT DISPUTE RESOLUTION TERMS HAVE A
VALUE TO EMPLOYERS THAT CAN BE APPRAISED, EVEN IF
IMPERFECTLY
Although tax law’s long-standing definition of gross income requires
the inclusion of new intangible assets when they are acquired by the tax-
payer, for practical purposes it must answer the question of what amount
should be included in gross income. The amount included in gross income
is the fair market value of the asset,316 defined by reference to a hypo-
thetical market transaction.317 Fair market value, says tax law, is the price
that would be agreed to by a hypothetical willing buyer and a hypotheti-
cal willing seller if each had “reasonable knowledge of [all] relevant
facts” and if neither were “under any compulsion” to transact.318
Although a hypothetical market transaction is referenced, tax law often
values assets that are rarely or never exchanged on the market.319 In
these cases, it often values an asset based on the projected, uncertain fi-
nancial benefits that the asset is anticipated to produce. For example, in
Newark Morning Ledger v. United States, the U.S. Supreme Court found
that existing subscriber relationships are an intangible asset to newspa-
pers and valued this intangible asset based on an estimate of future prof-
its that the newspapers reasonably anticipate receiving from identified
subscribers.320 Of course, estimated future profits were uncertain, and
this made the valuation somewhat speculative.321 Still, however, the
Court reviewed competing expert testimony and weighed assumptions
about the likelihood that subscribers in various categories would continue
315. See, e.g., Comm’r v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 429–30 (1955) (“This Court
has frequently stated that this language [‘all income from whatever source derived’] was
used by Congress to exert in this field ‘the full measure of its taxing power.’ . . . Congress
applied no limitations as to the source of taxable receipts, nor restrictive labels as to their
nature. And the Court has given a liberal construction to this broad phraseology in recog-
nition of the intention of Congress to tax all gains except those specifically exempted.”
(citations omitted)).
316. See Helvering v. Bruun, 309 U.S. 461, 464–65 (1940).
317. See United States v. Cartwright, 411 U.S. 546, 550–51 (1973).
318. Id. at 551 (quoting Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-1(b) (as amended in 1965)); see also id.
(“The willing buyer-willing seller test of fair market value is nearly as old as the federal
income, estate, and gifts taxes themselves . . . .”).
319. See, e.g., Phila. Park Amusement Co. v. United States, 126 F. Supp. 184, 187 (Ct.
Cl. 1954) (valuing a ten-year railway franchise received by the taxpayer from a governmen-
tal entity).
320. See Newark Morning Ledger v. United States, 507 U.S. 546, 570 (1993).
321. See id. at 570.
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their subscriptions (and if so, for how long).322 Based on imperfect as-
sumptions, the Court reached a conclusion as to the value to a newspaper
of an existing population of subscribers.323 Courts recognize that even
imperfect valuation, which depends on speculation and estimations, is
better than nothing.324
This Article will propose a starting valuation methodology based on
the projected financial benefits that coercive employment dispute resolu-
tion terms are likely to produce for the employers who impose them.
VI. HOW TO IMPLEMENT A TAX ON EMPLOYERS FOR
IMPOSING COERCIVE EMPLOYMENT DISPUTE
RESOLUTION TERMS
An employer who imposes a coercive employment dispute resolution
term on an employee realizes gross income as a result of that imposition
and should be taxed. This Part proposes how to implement such a tax.
A. REQUIRE AN EMPLOYER WHO IMPOSES A COERCIVE
EMPLOYMENT DISPUTE RESOLUTION TERM TO REPORT THE
GROSS INCOME
When an employer imposes a coercive employment dispute resolution
term on an employee, tax law should recognize that the employer has
obtained a new and valuable intangible asset.
The IRS should require the employer to establish the value it receives
from imposing the coercive employment dispute resolution term.325 As it
322. Id. at 551.
323. See id. at 570.
324. See generally Treas. Reg. § 1.61-2(d)(1) (taxing, and thus requiring taxpayers to
value non-cash compensation, including services “paid for in exchange for other services”);
id. § 1.61-2(d)(3) (taxing, and thus requiring taxpayers to value “living quarters or meals
which an employee receives in addition to his salary . . . unless they . . . meet the conditions
specified in section 119”); id. (taxing, and thus requiring taxpayers to approximate the
“rental value of parsonages” except to the extent excluded by section 107); id. § 1.61-
21(a)(1) (taxing, and thus requiring taxpayers to value fringe benefits, including “an em-
ployer-provided automobile [and chauffeur services], a flight on an employer-provided air-
craft, an employer-provided free or discounted commercial airline flight, an employer-
provided vacation, an employer-provided discount on property or services, an employer-
provided membership in a country club or other social club, and an employer-provided
ticket to an entertainment or sporting event” except to the extent excluded by section 132
and other sections); id. § 1.132-6(e)(2) (“Examples of fringe benefits that are not excluda-
ble from gross income as de minimis fringes are: season tickets to sporting or theatrical
events; the commuting use of an employer-provided automobile or other vehicle more
than one day a month; membership in a private country club or athletic facility, regardless
of the frequency with which the employee uses the facility; employer-provided group-term
life insurance on the life of the spouse or child of an employee; and use of employer-owned
or leased facilities (such as an apartment, hunting lodge, boat, etc.) for a weekend.”); S.
REP. NO. 93-768, at 157 (1974) (valuing several unique assets that are not exchanged on
any market, including use by family members of government aircraft); id. at 178 (conclud-
ing that valuation is appropriate even though “[b]y their very nature, the calculations of
benefits of this type and the allocations required cannot be made with precision”).
325. Even if a law is enacted that makes the coercive employment term unenforceable,
it generally should still be deemed to have value to the employer based on its ability to
discourage employees from initiating meritorious litigation.
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does when taxpayers acquire other valuable assets, the IRS should re-
quire employers to support their appraisals with competent evidence of
the value of the coercive employment dispute resolution terms that they
impose. This evidence likely will be difficult, but not impossible, to ob-
tain. It will often depend on expert reports. The need to acquire this evi-
dence will also discourage employers from engaging in excessive use of
coercive employment dispute resolution terms. Further, this evidence will
help inform employees and the public—who may underestimate the im-
pact of coercive employment dispute resolution terms—about how valua-
ble these terms are to employers and how correspondingly costly they are
to employees.
Finally, when an employer realizes gross income by imposing a coercive
employment dispute resolution term, the IRS should tax that income just
as it would tax any other realization of income.
Following this imposition of tax, the coercive employment term would
have a tax cost basis. If an employer met its burden of proving, consistent
with Treas. Reg. § 1.167-3(a), that the coercive employment term “is
known from experience or other factors to be of use in the business or in
the production of income for only a limited period, the length of which
can be estimated with reasonable accuracy,” then that employer should
be permitted to amortize the tax cost basis over that limited and determi-
nable useful life.326 However, if an employer did not meet its burden of
proving a limited and determinable useful life, then the tax cost basis of a
coercive employment dispute resolution term should be recoverable only
upon revocation of that coercive employment dispute term or upon the
sale or termination of the business. As existing law helpfully cautions,
“[a]n intangible asset, the useful life of which is not limited, is not subject
to the allowance for depreciation. No allowance will be permitted merely
because, in the unsupported opinion of the taxpayer, the intangible asset
has a limited useful life.”327 It is difficult to imagine how an employer
could impose an infinite or indefinite coercive employment dispute reso-
lution term on its workforce and then establish that the coercive employ-
ment dispute resolution term has a limited and determinable useful life.
Taxing employers when they impose coercive employment dispute resolu-
tion terms and then allowing employers to recover tax cost basis when
they revoke these terms would discourage employers from adopting or
continuing to use these terms.
B. GIVE NOTICE OF THE NEW ENFORCEMENT APPROACH THROUGH
A TREASURY REGULATION
As Part IV argues, this more aggressive tax treatment of coercive em-
ployment dispute resolution terms is consistent with foundational princi-
ples of tax law. Implementing this treatment would not require changes
326. Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-3(a).
327. Id.
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to the Internal Revenue Code. Arguably, it would not require changes to
Treasury regulations either. However, in an effort to provide fair notice
to taxpayers of a significant change to the IRS’s enforcement approach,
the Treasury should adopt a regulation under § 61. If it were the next-
adopted provision under § 61, it would be numbered Treasury Regulation
§ 1.61-23. It should provide:
An employer who imposes a mandatory arbitration provision, class
action waiver, or nondisclosure of dispute resolution provision on
any employee is in receipt of gross income, for federal income tax
purposes, to the extent of its value in United States currency. An
employer realizes gross income in each taxable year in which that
employer first imposes such a provision on any employee.
This language parallels the language of the treasure trove regulation.328 It
allows valuation methodologies for coercive employment dispute resolu-
tion terms to evolve and incorporate additional data. And it gives em-
ployers notice that they will be taxed for imposing these terms.
C. APPRAISE BASED ON DATA-DRIVEN DAMAGE MULTIPLIERS
For employers who impose coercive dispute resolution terms on their
employees, there are three main financial benefits: insurance against pay-
ing damages, reduced transaction costs, and public relations protections.
Each of these benefits is susceptible to valuation.
This Article will not propose a valuation methodology that accounts for
each of these benefits. It invites further development of its proposed val-
uation methodology to account for the reduced transaction costs and
public relations benefits that employers enjoy when they force employ-
ment disputes to be resolved via private arbitration and often with non-
disclosure provisions. For example, employers value avoiding the
employee strikes and consumer boycotts that they might suffer if their
illegal activity were disclosed through open litigation. Until the valuation
methodology accounts for all these benefits, it will understate the value of
coercive employment dispute resolution terms. However, even an incom-
plete valuation methodology comes closer to the value of these terms
than does our current tax treatment. Further, even an incomplete valua-
tion methodology would better discourage the use of these terms.
As an offer of proof as to the susceptibility of these benefits to valua-
tion, this Article will suggest a starting method to value the first benefit
that employers receive by imposing coercive employment dispute resolu-
tion terms: insurance against paying damages. Employers who impose co-
ercive employment dispute resolution terms can anticipate a dramatic
reduction in the damages that they will be required to pay to employees
who are the victims of their wrongdoing. Thus, this Article proposes a
starting valuation methodology that accounts for the lower claim rates,
328. See Treas. Reg. § 1.61-14(a) (as amended in 1993) (“Treasure trove, to the extent
of its value in United States currency, constitutes gross income for the taxable year in
which it is reduced to undisputed possession.”).
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lower win rates, and lower damage amounts experienced by employers
who shield themselves from liability through coercive employment dis-
pute resolution terms as compared to employers whose employees retain
access to the civil justice system.
The data shows several ways in which arbitration slashes the damages
that employers owe to their employees. First, Professor Estlund con-
cludes that “well under two percent of the employment claims that one
would expect to find in some forum, but that are covered by MAAs, ever
enter the arbitration process.”329 Thus, for every two arbitrations initi-
ated against an employer, we would expect to see one hundred lawsuits
initiated. Accordingly, an appraisal should presume that for every arbitra-
tion initiated against an employer, fifty lawsuits would have been initi-
ated.330 Additional data could help refine this number by, for example,
establishing that arbitrations combined with class action waivers should
be presumed to replace more court actions. Nonetheless, the assumption
that, for every one arbitration initiated against an employer, we would
have expected to see fifty court actions initiated is a sufficiently precise
datapoint to begin appraising the value to employers of mandatory arbi-
tration provisions. It captures the greatest benefit of mandatory arbitra-
tion to employers, which is the extinguishment of claims against them.
Second, Professors Stone and Colvin compared employee win rates
and damages in arbitration versus litigation and found that employees in
mandatory arbitration win “59 percent as often as in the federal courts
and only 38 percent as often as in state courts.”331 Similarly, “the median
. . . award in mandatory arbitration [is] only 21 percent of the median
award in the federal courts and 43 percent of the median award in the
state courts.”332 Combining the effects of arbitration’s lower employee
win rates and lower damage awards, the data establishes “that the aver-
age outcome in mandatory arbitration is only 16 percent of that in the
federal courts and 7 percent of that in state courts.”333 Thus, for every
dollar of damages an employer is forced to pay in arbitration, it would be
reasonable for an appraisal to assume that the employer would have had
to pay $6.25 in damages334 had the same issue been litigated in federal
court or $14.29335 had the same issue been litigated in state court instead
of being arbitrated.
Finally, and most importantly, combining Professors Stone and Col-
vin’s findings that employees win less frequently and are awarded lower
329. Estlund, supra note 23, at 696.
330. Observe that 2% = 2/100 = 1/50.
331. STONE & COLVIN, supra note 21, at 19.
332. Id.
333. Id.
334. $1 arbitration damages ÷ $6.25 federal court damages = 16%, for a simple repre-
sentation of “the average outcome in mandatory arbitration is only 16 percent of that in
the federal courts.” Id.
335. $1 arbitration damages ÷ $14.29 state court damages = 7% for a simple representa-
tion of “the average outcome in mandatory arbitration is only . . . 7 percent of that in state
courts.” Id.
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damages in arbitration with Professor Estlund’s findings that instead of
arbitrating, employees abandon 98% of claims that they would have liti-
gated, the multipliers increase.336 For every dollar of damages an em-
ployer is forced to pay in arbitration, an appraisal should presume that
the employer would have had to pay $312.50 in damages337 had employ-
ees litigated claims in federal court or $714.50 in damages338 had employ-
ees litigated claims in state court instead of either arbitrating or
predictably abandoning their claims in the face of arbitration. In other
words, the multipliers—that $1 of damages in arbitration would be associ-
ated with $312.50 of damages in federal court or $714.50 of damages in
state court—account for the far greater rate at which employees abandon
claims that they would have litigated instead of arbitrating them.
Let’s take an example (Example 1) of how this approach might work if
an employer who previously allowed its employees to litigate disputes
newly imposes a mandatory arbitration provision on its entire workforce.
Imagine that the employer has one hundred total employees and each
year, on average, pays $10,000 in total damages for wage and hour law
violations that its employees litigate in state court.339 This employer has
no history of paying damages in federal court and no history of violations
of other laws like antidiscrimination laws or reasonable accommodation
laws. After imposing the mandatory arbitration provision, this employer
should expect to pay less than $14 in total annual damages. The data
shows that only 2% of claims that would have been litigated are arbi-
trated,340 which reduces this employer’s annual anticipated damages from
$10,000 to $200. Given employees’ lower win rates and stingier damage
awards, their average award in mandatory arbitration is only 7% of that
in state courts,341 which reduces this employer’s annual anticipated dam-
ages from $200 to $14. If we further assume that the average employee
will work for three years after the mandatory arbitration provision is im-
posed and that a 5% discount rate properly accounts for the time value of
money, then this employer’s imposition of a mandatory arbitration provi-
sion results in $27,194.35342 of gross income on which the employer
should pay tax.343
336. See id.; Estlund, supra note 23, at 696 (“[W]ell under two percent of the employ-
ment claims that one would expect to find in some forum, but that are covered by MMAs,
ever enter the arbitration process.”).
337. $6.25 × 50 (for the fifty court cases brought for each arbitration brought) = $312.50.
338. $14.29 × 50 (for the fifty court cases brought for each arbitration brought) =
$714.50.
339. This might occur because the employer paid $30,000 three years ago and nothing
for the last two years or because the employer paid $10,000 each in each of the last three
years.
340. See Estlund, supra note 23, at 696.
341. STONE & COLVIN, supra note 21, at 19.
342. The net present value of $10,000 each over three years assuming a 5% discount
rate is $27,232.48. The net present value of $14 each over three years assuming a 5% dis-
count rate is $38.13. The accession to wealth of paying $38.13 in arbitration damages to
save $27,232.48 in litigation damages is $27,194.35.
343. This value would likely be higher if the mandatory arbitration provision were com-
bined with a class action waiver. See Estlund, supra note 23, at 706–07.
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It is an advantage of this method that a less scrupulous employer—say
one who each year, on average, pays $100,000 in damages for violations
of wage and hour laws—would instead pay tax on $271,943.55344 of gross
income for imposing the same mandatory arbitration provision on a
workforce of the same size. The method reflects that such a provision is
more valuable to an unscrupulous employer.
Of course, these multipliers also work in reverse, which is helpful for
valuing an employer’s imposition of an existing coercive employment dis-
pute resolution term on a new employee. In such a case, an appraisal
should begin by looking at average annual arbitration damages paid by
that employer to its existing employees on a per-employee basis. Arbitra-
tion damages for violations of federal law should be multiplied by
$312.50.345 Arbitration damages for violations of state law should be mul-
tiplied by $714.50.346 If average annual per-employee arbitration awards
are multiplied by the appropriate multiplier, the result is a reasonable
estimate of the damages that the employer will annually save by imposing
its coercive dispute resolution term on each additional employee.347
344. The net present value of $100,000 each over three years assuming a 5% discount
rate is $272,324.80. The net present value of $140 each over three years assuming a 5%
discount rate is $381.25. The accession to wealth of paying $381.25 in arbitration damages
to save $272,324.80 in litigation damages is $271,943.55.
345. This multiplier reflects that employees arbitrate 2% of the claims that they would
have litigated, see supra notes 329–330 and accompanying text, and receive average arbi-
tration damages that are 16% of what they would have received in federal courts. See supra
text accompanying note 333. Alternatively, $312.50 × 2% = $6.25, and $6.25 × 16% = $1.
346. Notice that $14 arbitration damages × 714.50 = $10,003 litigation damages in state
court is consistent with Example 1. This multiplier reflects that employees arbitrate 2% of
the claims that they would have litigated, see supra notes 329–30 and accompanying text,
and receive average arbitration damages that are 7% of what they would have received in
state courts. See supra text accompanying note 333. Alternatively, $714.50 × 2% = $14.29,
and $14.29 × 7% = $1.
347. A reader might argue that valuing a difficult-to-value intangible asset (here, the
coercive employment dispute resolution term) so that it can be taxed at acquisition is not
worth the effort, particularly since a coercive employment dispute resolution term will
cause an employer to have increased net profits over time and thus increased tax liability
over time. This might lead a reader to think that, if the value due to a coercive employment
term is taxed in the end, why go to the effort and difficulty of taxing it in the beginning?
This argument was raised in briefing in Bruun and failed to persuade the Court, which
required inclusion in gross income upon the tenant improvements being acquired by the
landlord at lease termination. See Helvering v. Bruun, 309 U.S. 461, 467 (1940). It should
similarly fail to persuade here. In tax law, a substantial number of tax benefits come in the
form of delaying the imposition of tax on accessions to wealth. Nonrecognition treatment
available to like-kind exchanges, transfer of property at divorce, and certain corporate and
partnership formations differ from recognition treatment in that the tax on income is
delayed. See 26 U.S.C. §§ 1031, 1036, 1041. Similarly, immediate expensing of outlays dif-
fers from gradual depreciation only on the basis of the timing of the tax benefit, not the
amount of tax benefit. Compare id. § 168(a)–(c) (providing depreciation deductions of
property over specified recovery period), with id. § 168(k) (providing a 100% depreciation
deduction in year property is placed in service). The same can be said of the fundamental
distinction between immediately deductible expenses and gradually depreciable or even
non-depreciable expenditures. The timing of tax liabilities and tax benefits is the bulk of
tax planning and is a big-money issue for taxpayers and the Treasury. Waiting to tax for
when an increased net profit stream becomes subject to tax over time would provide an
important and highly valuable subsidy to coercive employment dispute resolution terms.
See Morrow, supra note 175, at 335. This author opposes such a subsidy and notes that it
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Let’s take an example (Example 2) of how this approach might work if
an employer who previously imposed a mandatory arbitration provision
on its entire workforce hired a new employee subject to that provision.
Imagine that prior to hiring the new employee, the employer had 100
total employees and each year, on average, pays $200 in arbitration dam-
ages for violations that would otherwise have been litigated in state court
plus $100 for violations that otherwise would have been litigated in fed-
eral court. This breaks down to $2 and $1 on an annual, per-employee
basis. However, if these same employees were able to pursue their claims
in state courts and federal courts, data establishes that they would pursue
their claims far more frequently, win far more often, and win bigger.348
Thus, we would expect them to receive damage awards of $1,429 in state
court349 plus $312.50 in federal court350 on an annual, per employee basis.
If we further assume that the average employee will work for three years
after being hired and that a 5% discount rate properly accounts for the
time value of money, then each time the employer imposes its mandatory
arbitration provision on a newly hired employee, it results in $4,734.37351
gross income on which the employer should pay tax. Again, this number
would be higher if the employer were less scrupulous or if the coercive
employment term were broader.
Of course, any particular employer might argue that these multipliers
are inaccurate in their particular case, and the burden of proof would be
on that employer to establish better-tailored multipliers. Employers an-
ticipating valuation disputes might engage in desired actions like limiting
their use of arbitration provisions, decoupling them from class action
waivers, or lifting the veil of secrecy on arbitration outcomes.
Similarly, the IRS might argue that comparisons of filing rates, win
rates, and damages fail to sufficiently account for selection effects. Em-
ployers who impose coercive employment dispute resolution terms on
their employees might have higher rates of misconduct against their em-
ployees than do employers who do not limit the dispute resolution oppor-
tunities of their employees. All of this is to say that valuation is not
would encourage employers to impose more and broader coercive employment dispute
resolution terms. A taxpayer who acquires a new business entity has an accession to wealth
at the moment of acquisition even though acquiring a new business entity will cause the
taxpayer to receive increased profits over time and even though those increased profits will
cause the taxpayer to have increased tax liability over time. A taxpayer who acquires a new
rental property has an accession to wealth at the moment of acquisition even though ac-
quiring a new rental property will cause the taxpayer to receive increased rents over time
and even though those increase rents will cause the taxpayer to have increased tax liability
over time. The anticipation of future tax on an increased income stream does not negate
that the acquisition of an income-producing property constitutes an immediate realization
of income. See Bruun, 309 U.S. at 467.
348. See supra text accompanying notes 329–35.
349. $2 × 714.50 = $1,429.
350. $1 × 312.50 = $312.50.
351. The net present value of $1,741.50 (reflecting $1,429 + $312.50) each over three
years assuming a 5% discount rate is $4,742.54. The net present value of $3 each over three
years assuming a 5% discount rate is $8.17. The accession to wealth of paying $8.17 in
arbitration damages to save $4,742.54 in litigation damages is $4,734.37.
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perfect and will evolve with additional information. Nonetheless, these
multipliers offer a reasonable starting point to value the benefit that em-
ployers capture by imposing coercive employment dispute resolution
terms. Each time an employer imposes such a term on a new employee,
the employer should be taxed.
VII. CONCLUSION
When an employer imposes a coercive employment dispute resolution
term on a worker, that employer obtains a new and valuable intangible
asset. Thus, according to foundational principles of tax law, the employer
should be taxed. The IRS’s failure to tax employers who impose these
terms has effectively created a tax subsidy for coercive employment dis-
pute resolution terms that will cause an ever-increasing number of Amer-
ican workers to become subject to them. This subsidy should end.
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